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Barriers to conflict resolution are many, and much has been written about them. In Insightful or Wishful: Lawyer’s Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, a legal studies research paper for the new law school at the University of California at Irvine, noted American psychologist Elizabeth Loftus addresses another barrier to settlement that we lawyers are loath to admit: overconfidence. Indeed, the “saber rattling” of mediation colloquy can sound like the dramatic dialogue out of a Star Wars movie:

Luke: Soon I’ll be dead and you with me. Translated: We’re spending a boatload of money litigating this case but you will run out of money before we do.

The Emperor: [laughing] Perhaps you refer to the eminent attack of your rebel fleet? Yes, I assure you, we are quite safe from your friends here. Translated: Perhaps you refer to your army of expensive expert witnesses. They are no threat to us. I assure you we are prepared to destroy their testimony.

Luke: Your overconfidence is your weakness. Translated: Your overconfidence is your weakness.

The Emperor: Your faith in your friends is yours. Translated: Don’t count on the jury to bail you out of this one.

But lawyers are supposed to be confident, right? Yes, but there is a difference between having confidence and the courage of your convictions and overconfidence and the consequences of poor judgment. In an amusing analogy, Professor Loftus compares and contrasts lawyers and weather forecasters.

First, meteorologists cannot in any way influence the outcome of their predictions. Nothing they do can make it rain. Lawyers, on the other hand, can behave in ways that influence the case outcome. Because they have this opportunity, they may overestimate their own capacity and neglect the importance of factors beyond their control. Second, lawyers have a much keener interest in the goals of their predictions than do meteorologists. Because of this, lawyers might be susceptible to over optimism and wishful thinking.

The central focus of Professor Loftus’ study is the degree of accuracy in lawyers’ forecasts of case outcomes. To read the entire research paper click here. (PDF)  Meanwhile, the following quotes provide a glimpse of her insightful observations :

In summary, whether lawyers can accurately predict the outcome of a case has practical consequences in at least three areas: (a) the lawyer’s professional reputation and financial success; (b) the satisfaction of the client; and (c) the justice environment as a whole. Litigation is risky, time consuming, and expensive.

The consequences of judgmental errors by lawyers can be costly for lawyers and their clients, as well as an unnecessary burden on an already overloaded justice system. Ultimately, a lawyer’s repute is based on successful calculations of case outcome. A lawyer who advises clients to pursue litigation without delivering a successful outcome will not have clients for long. Likewise, a client will be most satisfied with a lawyer who is accurate and realistic when detailing the potential outcomes of the case. At the end of the day, it is the accurate predictions of the lawyer that enable the justice system to function smoothly without the load of cases that were not appropriately vetted by the lawyers.

A lawyer who cannot accurately predict the outcome of a case or who does not thoroughly and efficiently appreciate the litigation risks may ignore alternatives to trial and advise the client to reject reasonable settlement offers. A lawyer who underestimates potential outcomes may advise the client to accept an unreasonably lower amount in settlement than is warranted.

Another factor that might affect the realism of lawyers’ assessments of future goals is perception of control. The extent to which an individual believes he or she can take steps to increase the likelihood of a desirable outcome has been shown to bias confidence estimates in those outcomes. When an event is perceived to be controllable, overconfidence is likely. This bias is linked to what Langer (1975) called an illusion of control, defined as “an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant”.

Lawyers frequently made substantial judgmental errors, showing a proclivity to over optimism. The most biased estimates were expressed with very high initial confidence: In these instances, lawyers were extremely overconfident. These findings are consistent with a large body of literature documenting overconfidence in a range of judgments.

With regard to gender, we replicated results obtained by Malsch (1990) that female lawyers were better calibrated than their male colleagues. Male practitioners were more overconfident than female practitioners. These findings are in line with gender differences observed in research on metacognition.

One implication of the present findings is that lawyer performance can be improved by implementing case management strategies that take into account the potential overconfidence biases of the litigators.Case consultations with legal peers can take place informally. For example, in many legal firms, regular meetings are held where cases are periodically reviewed so that the partners can manage the caseload efficiently and ethically. These meetings provide ideal opportunities to obtain objective opinions from other legal professionals in the form of third-party feedback about the strengths and weaknesses of a case and the likelihood that the stated goals can be achieved.

This study shows that lawyers can be too confident. When lawyers do not fully assess the risks or acknowledge certain aspects of the case that may be beyond their control, over-(and under) valuations can happen, making settlement impossible. Objectivity requires lawyers to walk a fine line, some would call it a high wire balancing act, between zealous advocacy and wise counsel. Indeed, wisdom is the safety net that keeps litigators from crashing to the earth.

May the Force be with you.

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Parties hungering for their day in court must digest the potential repercussions of the carrot and stick procedures enacted by their respective legislatures to encourage the pre-trial settlement of disputes. Federal Court Rule 68 provides that a plaintiff whose judgment is less than defendant’s statutory settlement offer may be required to pay defendant’s costs, including deposition costs, filing fees, and other costs incurred after the offer expires. In certain cases, Rule 68 can also be used to cut off plaintiff’s claims for attorney fees incurred after the settlement offer.  Some state courts rules, such as California’s Code of Civil Procedure section 998 and Texas’s Rule 167, add to the list of recoverable costs, attorney fees and expert witness fees in cases where the terms of the statutory settlement offer were more favorable that the final judgment. 

It has been suggested that the correct usage of the carrot and stick idiom is actually “carrot on a stick,” referring to the hapless donkey tricked into pulling a cart by the lure of a carrot dangling from a stick. But studies have shown that rewards alone have little impact on cooperation among human beings, although punishment alone can be motivational.  But when rewards and punishment are combined the effect on cooperation is dramatic, suggesting that the more realistic image of the donkey and the cart would have the driver holding the stick attached to a carrot in one hand and a prodding stick in the other. Similarly, in civil trial courts, the benefits of compromise alone may not be enough to induce parties to negotiate in good faith, but when combined with the threat of having to pay the other side's costs, litigants are generally sufficiently motivated to settle their lawsuits.

In California, for example, a party may serve a written offer to compromise prior to trial, and if the offer is rejected and the opponent does not receive an award at trial greater than the offer, then the party that rejects the pre-trial offer may be ordered to pay the offeror's costs. This gives the parties strong financial incentives to make reasonable settlement offers and burdensome disincentives to discourage the rejection of them.

Unfortunately, some litigants do not even consider the possibility of paying the other side's costs when considering the settlement value of their cases, or, in some states where attorney and expert witness fees can be awarded, they make the mistake of only evaluating general litigation costs such as filings fees, the cost of deposition transcripts, and service of process fees.  When a statutory pre-trial offer is made, the trial lawyer must understand that the offer has created a floor that must be exceeded in order to collect his costs and avoid having to pay his opponent’s litigation costs.

The possibility of a statutory offer of settlement can induce parties to participate cooperatively during a mediation session. In preparation for mediation, counsel will usually calculate the settlement value of a case by analyzing the likelihood of success at trial both as to liability and damages. The damage estimate will then be discounted by some percentage to reflect the possibility that the trial will not proceed according to plan. If, however, counsel must also consider whether the damage award will exceed the amount of a "statutory offer," then the analysis becomes more complicated and the stakes at mediation increase.

For example, suppose plaintiff's counsel believes his case is worth $1,000,000 in damages, but for purposes of settlement discussions considers $800,000 as a reasonable amount for settlement. Without the carrot and stick of a statutory pre-trial offer, plaintiff's counsel need only worry about the other side's costs if no money is awarded at trial. Being extremely confident, counsel considers the likelihood of a jury awarding nothing to be zero. Therefore, counsel concludes $800,000 is the minimum amount that should be accepted at mediation.

On the other hand, suppose counsel's preparation includes an analysis of the other side's costs and what would have to be achieved at trial to avoid having to pay them, and then he fully explains the ramifications of statutory offers to his client.prior to the mediation. Now he will be better prepared to evaluate the risks of trial should the other side's best offer be less than he expected, say $500,000. As a result, plaintiff's counsel will be in stronger negotiating position and better able to meet the needs of his client, knowing the likely floor that he must exceed at trial in order to prevent his client from having to pay defendant's costs which, for a million dollar case, could be hundreds of thousands of dollars..Given this risk, plaintiff's counsel will be more willing to come off the original  $800,000 target number during mediation.

The possibility of paying the other side's costs, especially if they include attorney and expert fees, is a powerful incentive to negotiate in the utmost good faith. As demonstrated above, the cost-shifting feature of statutes such as Federal Rule 68 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 998 can be a carrot to entice reasonable settlement offers and a big stick to discourage rejection of settlement offers. Use this tool to your advantage at mediation. You will increase your negotiating leverage while demonstrating that you are a wise steward of your client's litigation dollars.

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Veteran Utah trial lawyer Harold G. Christensen recently published Samurai Lawyer, a pithy book that provides excellent counsel to trial lawyers based upon “The Samurai Way” of living (and dying, I might add). However, given the fact that more than ninety percent of civil cases settle before trial, it is negotiation skills, not trial skills, that are most often called upon by litigators, and yet relatively little attention is given to them 

 In Japan, samurai were warrior servants who embodied the law of bushido, a Japanese word formed from two other words: bukyo, meaning “The Warrior’s Creed,” and shido which means, “The Way of Gentlemen”. Litigators who adopt these principles to enhance their negotiating skills will resolve their clients’ disputes more effectively and will become more than courtroom warriors; they will be valued as wise and trusted counselors at law.

                                                           I. VISION

A successful negotiator has outstanding vision; he sees both the strengths and weaknesses of his case. He has the capacity to look beyond the narrow focus of advocacy and peer into the broad spectrum of possible outcomes through the eyes of the judge or the jury. He meticulously evaluates the law and facts advocated by his opponent, knowing, as did the samurai, that “You must understand the conditions on the opposite shore to comprehend your side of the river.” This perspective minimizes negotiating mistakes, which, studies have shown, occur more frequently with plaintiffs, but that when defendants do make them, they are really big mistakes resulting in awards much higher than plaintiff’s last pre-trial settlement offer.

                                                           II. PREPARATION

Samurai negotiators know “When you’re thirsty it’s too late to start thinking about digging a well,” so they prepare for the negotiations in every detail. Foundational questions include:

• What do I want to accomplish through the negotiation?
•  What outcomes would not be acceptable?
• Why would these outcomes not be acceptable?
• What are the terms that I must have vs. terms I would like to have?

In their seminal work, Getting to Yes,” Fisher and Ury suggested that negotiators prepare by determining their BATNA, their best alternative to a negotiated agreement. In other words, the client would rather  go to trial than accept an amount lower than the bottom number in her settlement range, if she is the plaintiff, or if she is the defendant, she would prefer going to trial rather than pay more than the highest number in her settlement range. In order to establish their BATNA, successful negotiators determine in advance the point at which the risks of trial outweigh the concessions their client must make to settle the case.

Trial risks can be effectively evaluated through decision tree analysis, in which the key events of the litigation through trial are projected, and an estimate of the probability for success or failure of these events is assigned. A decision tree visually depicts this process in as much detail as may be desired. A more complex decision tree may include the chances of success of potentially dispositive motions, such as summary judgment, or the impact of rulings on certain key evidence. If, on the other hand, the evaluation is limited to liability and damages, the basic question is what are the chances of prevailing on the issue of liability? If liability can be established, what is the range of damages likely to be awarded? The outcome will provide a range for settlement purposes.

                                                            III. Benevolence

“A wise man hears one and hears ten,” so goes the Japanese proverb. Litigators are not known for their benevolence in the courtroom; however, it is an important characteristic for negotiators, who must look beyond economics to see if there are additional motivating factors on the other side of the table. Successful negotiators consider the following:

• What are the conditions and circumstances of the other side?
• What is the financial condition of the other side?
• What business or personal pressures is the other side facing?
• What would my interests be if I were on the other side?

In addition, such things as the titles and responsibilities of the other side’s negotiating team, and their respective ages, length of employment, and relevant experience should be considered. But it does not stop there; successful negotiators also take into consideration the age, health, and financial condition of their clients, including the impact of the litigation on work and family, for successful negotiators understand that, win or lose, trials exact a price beyond money from all of its participants.

                                                             IV. WISDOM

Often, litigants negotiating a dispute will fall into the “You go first” trap. They want the other side to make the first offer and this often leads to frustration, mistrust, and, ultimately, an unsuccessful negotiation. Wise negotiators understand, “Knowledge without wisdom is a load of books on the back of an ass.” They recognize the psychological affects of anchoring and framing, concepts that inure to the benefit of the party who is willing to make the initial move during negotiations. Anchoring occurs when one of the parties makes the first reasonable settlement offer, one that suggests that the target figure is within reasonable range of the likely outcome if the case were to proceed to trial. Studies have shown that the party making the first reasonable offer will likely succeed in the negotiation as the other side must respond to the range that has been set.

Framing is a concept that gives the wise negotiator additional advantages by providing persuasive context to the negotiations. It can cause the other party to focus on features within a desired construct while disregarding other aspects arising from the disputed event. For example, in the realm of politics, we see national leaders framing the debate over health care. While one side has attempted to frame the debate by focusing on the importance of extending health care for everyone, the other side seems to have taken control of the debate by framing the issue as the nationalizing of health care for the benefit of a small group of uninsured people at great cost to the majority of Americans who are content with the status quo. As a result, the party in power has been put on the defensive and has been forced to react within the framework established by the “loyal opposition.” For the litigated case, framing is most effective during the initial phase of negotiations, either during pre-settlement correspondence, in mediation or settlement briefs or during a joint mediation session prior to caucusing. Thoughtfully done, framing can influence the subsequent behavior of both sides: for the “framer” it provides a pattern for organizing and shaping persuasive arguments, while placing on the other side the onus of responding within the desired framework.

                                                            V. HONESTY

Litigators may enlist many strategies during settlement negotiations: anchoring, framing, indifference, aggression, to name a few; but the samurai negotiator understands that honesty and integrity are perhaps the two most powerful tools available to him. He recognizes the truth of the Japanese proverb, which states, “Darkness reigns at the foot of the lighthouse.” Honesty can provide the light that engenders trust; trust will beget understanding; and understanding most often results in the resolution of a dispute, not because either side concedes it is wrong, but because of enlightened self-interest. Honesty also protects the negotiator who may be tempted to blur the line between “puffing” and deceit during negotiations. “ Indeed, cases from twenty-eight states hold that '[a]n attorney can be liable to a non client, even an adversary in litigation, for fraud or deceit.' " Shafer v. Berger Kahn, et.al. (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4^th 54. 

                                                            VI. LOYALTY

Hojo Shigetoki was a samurai warrior of the Kamakura period of the 13^th Century. His writings influenced generations of samurai who followed him. He said this about loyalty: “When one is serving officially or in the master's court, he should not think of a hundred or a thousand people, but should consider only the importance of the master.” Of course attorneys have the highest ethical obligations to their clients. Occasionally, however, clients may call into question the motivation of their attorneys during negotiations. In a recent case that cast into question the breadth of the mediation privilege in California, a client sued his lawyer for malpractice on the basis that the attorney forced him to settle the case. Cassell v. Superior Court, Cal App 4^th 2009/B215215. The samurai negotiator always places the interests of his client ahead of all other considerations.

                                                            VII. COURAGE

Some trial lawyers feel that settlement negotiations are for the faint of heart. Samurai negotiators understand this mentality. In fact they know there are certain cases that must go to trial, and they prepare for that possibility. But they also know that most of the time, lawsuits are resolved through negotiations, so they prepare themselves and their clients accordingly. This takes professional courage. Clients focused on justice do not always appreciate being told that a judge or jury may not agree with them. At the risk of offending or even losing their clients, samurai negotiators fully inform their clients of the realities of the case: that the costs of litigation may outweigh the upside potential of the damage award, that the judge may limit critical evidence, that the jury may not believe the expert witnesses, or any number of things that make ceding control of a case to a tribunal of strangers a very risky proposition. This leads samurai negotiators to engage in settlement negotiations prior to trial as forcefully and effectively as they would prosecute a trial, for they know, as the samurai knew, that “A good sword is the one left in its scabbard.”

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