Calculating Settlement Value Like a Super Bowl Champion

 

The New York Giants are playing the New England Patriots in the Super Bowl, again. What would happen if the Patriots prepared for the game by focusing exclusively on their strengths and the Giants’ weaknesses while ignoring their own weaknesses and the Giants’ strengths?  That would be ridiculous, right? Bill Belichick, Tom Brady? Forget about it. No way. Those guys will be prepared for every contingency, every angle, and every trick play.

Preparing for mediation is a lot like preparing for a football game-it requires strategic thinking and careful planning. Yet oftentimes I see parties who refuse to recognize the strengths of the opposition or acknowledge any weaknesses in their own cases. They act as if no one will be contesting the outcome if the case goes to trial.  On the other hand, parties who prepare for mediation by conducting an objective risk analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the case almost always find reasons to negotiate a successful resolution of the dispute.

 A recent story in a Wisconsin law blog illustrates this point:

National Maintenance and Repair, a tugboat shipyard and barge repair facility, on Tuesday requested that Madison County Circuit Judge Dennis Ruth prevent an economics expert from testifying on behalf of a man suing the company.

Shannon Blair, 41, is suing National Maintenance and Repair claiming his right arm was mangled when a large metal ball attached to a crane fell on it while he was working on a barge on the upper Mississippi River.

The company disputes Dr. Rebecca Summary's testimony in a 13-page motion to disqualify.

"Dr. Summary's calculation of lost earnings and fringe benefits lack an adequate and reliable foundation," the motion reads. "At deposition, Dr. Summary acknowledged that Plaintiff returned to work for National Maintenance on July 26, 2010. However, only her calculation of past lost wages accounts for this fact. With respect to future lost earnings and benefits, Dr. Summary inexplicably decided that Plaintiff would stop working on the first day of trial and would never work again. Such an assumption is unsupported in the evidence and is belied by reality."

She calculated Blair's lost earnings at $1.7 million.

"Even were the Court to accept Dr. Summary's figures and assumptions, her arithmetic is wrong. Using her own figures and assumptions, Dr. Summary overstates Plaintiff's alleged future lost wages by $251, 700," the motion states.

"As the foregoing illustrates, Dr. Summary's opinions do not bear sufficient indicia of reliability and the bases for her opinions are simply not trustworthy."


A party who ignores the possibility that such key evidence could be excluded will not be able to objectively consider the reasonable settlement value of the case, and the litigants will almost always be forced to go to trial because at least one side’s settlement value is based on unrealistic assumptions.  So on the question of lost earnings in this example, what are the chances that the motion will be granted? If it is fifty-fifty, the settlement value would be $850,000 (1,700,000 x .50), assuming 100% liability. What if liability is fifty-fifty? Then the settlement value of the lost earnings claim would be $425,000 (1,700,000 x .50 x .50). Even if the plaintiff got his expert testimony into evidence, what are the chances the damages will be reduced by $251,000 due to the alleged arithmetic errors? If there were a 25% chance of that, the plaintiff would have to do another calculation: $1,700,000 x .50 x .50 -251,000 x .25=$362,250. Under these circumstances from the plaintiff's perspective the reasonable range of settlement of the lost earnings claim is $425,000 to $362,250.

Of course the defendant may have some different assumptions about the likelihood of having its motion granted, so that the defendant's range of settlement may be different. That's okay. It should be expected.  So, for example, what if the defendant believes there is a 50% chance on liability, a 75% chance the motion will be granted, and a 10% chance the court will agree the math is wrong? The defendant's range of settlement would be $212,500 (1,700,000 x .50 x .25) to $187,500 (1,700,000 x .50 x .25-251,000 x .10).

Now we see a range of settlement that includes the plaintiff's high of $425,000 and defendant's low of $187,500. There is still a large gap but the parties are now within a reasonable range to get a deal done. By comparison, if plaintiff had assumed he had a 100% chance of defeating the motion and defendant assumed it had a 100% chance of having its motion granted, the range would have been $1,700,000 to $0. I can hear it now, "I am not going to dignify that number with a response. You tell him to get real or we will see him at trial!" And the plaintiff, "Zero? Are you kidding me? I'll see them in court!" Such failure to make reasonable assumptions about the likelihood of success almost always forces the parties into a trial that neither one really wants.

There are many variables that go into determining the settlement value of a case, and the more of them you take into consideration the more realistic the numbers will become. You would, of course, always factor in the likelihood of success on the questions of liability and damages, but what about the chances of winning or losing a summary judgment motion; a motion to preclude evidence; or some other dispositive motion? What about litigation costs and the possibility of having to pay the other side’s attorney fees if you lose? When two sides carefully think through these types of issues, they almost always come to the mediation within striking distance of each other’s settlement range and when that happens-TOUCHDOWN! Both sides win.

Deja Brew: A Mediator Looks Back at the Hot Coffee Case or How to Keep Your Dispute from Spilling into Court

 

Even after twenty years, the so-called “McDonald’s coffee case” or “hot coffee case” is still the poster child of tort reform advocates and the rally cry of consumer attorneys. The former decry a legal system which permits such “frivolous” lawsuits while the latter complain that public relations firms distort the facts of the case to engender public sympathy for big business. Let’s pivot away from the politics of the case and, going back in time, look at the lawsuit from a neutral perspective-as people who want to resolve a dispute as efficiently and effectively as possible. Like a mediator.

The hot coffee case is reported in Wikipedia. Using the facts reported in the article, let’s consider what risks were involved in the case and identify some of the barriers to settlement. What was it about the settlement negotiations that made trial a better option for the parties than a settlement? In other words, using Fisher and Ury’s term from their national bestseller Getting to Yes, what was the BATNA-the best alternative to a negotiated agreement-for each party, and why was trial deemed to be a better option than the settlement terms that were offered? This is a question every litigant must consider in order to properly prepare for settlement negotiations.

Your BATNA becomes evident through rigorous risk analysis of the legal, economic, and emotional aspects of the dispute. You should also consider these things from your opponent's perspective. Unless you attempt to view the case from the other side’s perspective of the risks and rewards of the case, you may force your opponent to engage in a trial that no one really wants. Therefore the key to effective negotiations is finding a reasonable settlement range that takes into account the risks and rewards of trial for both sides. The plaintiff will not agree with the lowest number in the settlement range and the defendant won’t agree with the highest, but once both parties find themselves in the same settlement range, settlements almost always happen. It is the mediator’s job to help them get there. Unfortunately, it appears the parties in the hot coffee case were never in the same range until after the trial.

The Accident

  • A 79-year-old woman ordered a 49-cent cup of coffee from a drive-in window at a McDonald’s restaurant. The cup had a warning label about the hot coffee.
  • McDonald’s served coffee at 180-190 degrees. At that temperature, the coffee would cause third-degree burns in two to seven seconds.   
  • While sitting in the passenger seat of a parked car, the woman placed the cup between her legs and pulled the lid toward her to remove it. In the process, she spilled the coffee on her lap.
  • She suffered third-degree burns on six-percent of her skin and lesser burns over sixteen percent. She was hospitalized for eight days, underwent skin grafting, and spent the next two years receiving medical treatment.
  • Her past medical expenses were $10,500; her future medical expenses were $2500; and her lost income was $5000 for a total of approximately $18,000.

 Pre-trial Settlement Negotiations

The plaintiff made a pre-lawsuit offer of settlement in the sum of $20,000. McDonald’s offered $800.  McDonald’s also rejected a pre-trial offer of $90,000, and then a $300,000 offer, and a final pre-trial mediator’s proposal of $225,000.

Trial, Verdict, and Post-Trial Settlement

At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence of measures that could have been taken to reduce the risk of burning and evidence of 700 other burn victims. The jury returned a verdict that awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million in punitive damages. The punitive damages were apparently based on plaintiff’s counsel’s argument that McDonald’s took in $1.35 million in coffee sales per day, and the jury awarded two days worth of sales as a punishment for what happened. The jury did find the plaintiff was 20% at fault, so the compensatory damages were reduced to $160,000. The judge reduced the punitive damages to three times the compensatory amount, for a total of $640,000.

Eventually the parties entered into a confidential settlement prior to the filing of an appeal, presumably in an amount that substantially exceeded McDonald’s initial offer of $800.

Observations

The settlement value of the hot coffee case must be analyzed from a pre-trial and post- verdict perspective.

Pre-trial: What were the chances the jury would find McDonald’s liable? Was the warning on the cup sufficient? Did the plaintiff have any comparative fault? McDonald’s pre-trial offer of $800 seems to indicate that it did not believe a jury would find the company liable under the facts of the case. In addition, the $800 was more than the $714 average settlement given to 700 other burn victims. The defense may have also factored in the high cost of litigation the plaintiff would face and expected a considerable discount from the plaintiff as a result.

The plaintiff though had real injuries and verifiable damages of $18,000. The plaintiff may have felt that the initial settlement offer of $20,000 was reasonable given her actual damages and considerable pain and suffering. Two-thousand dollars for pain and suffering would be more than fair and reasonable, plaintiff must have thought. But did the plaintiff factor in the possibility that a jury would not find McDonald’s liable? Did she really have a 100% chance of success? Could it have been a 75% chance, or some other number? Even if she was 100% certain that McDonald’s would be liable, did she consider that a jury might find that she was also at fault and that her damages could be reduced by some amount on a comparative fault basis?

McDonald’s turned down plaintiff’s pre-trial settlement offer of $90,000. Given the $160,000 of compensatory damages actually awarded by the jury, it seems the $90,000 offer was within a reasonable range. Without more information it is hard to tell the dynamics at this point, but it seems McDonald’s had a totally different view of the case, probably because the medical expenses were only $10,500. McDonald’s probably thought that even if it were found to be liable, an award for pain and suffering would not be more than 3 or 4 times the medical expenses, so the cap on the damages would be limited to no more than $52,000. Therefore, a settlement of $90,000 was unacceptable to McDonald’s because it represented a valuation that was almost two times the amount plaintiff was likely to get on her best day of trial.

McDonald’s then turned down plaintiff’s pre-trial settlement offer of $300,000 and the mediator’s settlement proposal of $225,000. Very interesting: generally the plaintiff would have attempted a compromise by going below her last number which was $90,000. Why did the next offer go up, and not down? Probably because the plaintiff uncovered evidence to support a claim for punitive damages, so the price of settlement went up. It is a funny thing though-most businesses do not want to settle a case based upon potential punitive damages. That is because the burden of proof is so high that it is hard to get punitive damages, so businesses adopt the attitude, “if you want punis you’re going to have to take them from me at trial.” It is a business risk they are often willing to take.

McDonald’s may have thought they could keep evidence of the other burn victims out of the trial by filing a motion to exclude such evidence. I noticed in the court docket numerous motions to exclude filed by McDonald’s, including a “Motion to Exclude Prior Deposition Testimony and Photographs of other Burn Injuries at Trial. (08/04/1994)” Apparently the motion was denied which then let the jury consider McDonald’s prior knowledge of the danger of the 190 degree coffee which apparently led to an award of punitive damages.

I recommend that every trial risk analysis include the possibility of favorable and unfavorable outcomes for law and motion matters. For example, what are the chances of excluding certain evidence and if the motion fails, could the potential damages increase? From the plaintiff’s side, a risk analysis may include the possibility of losing a motion for summary judgment or the impact on damages if a motion to exclude evidence is granted.

A final thought about punitive damages:  court’s have the authority to reduce awards for punitive damages if the amount is deemed to be excessive on constitutional grounds. Here, the trial court reduced punitive damages to three times the compensatory damages. The days of huge punitive damage awards of ten, fifteen, or a hundred times the amount of the compensatory damages are long gone. The U.S. Supreme Court opinion in the State Farm v. Campbell case (where the compensatory/punitive damages ratio was 145:1) a few years ago changed all of that. Plaintiffs need to account for that in their risk analysis and expectations. Trial courts seem to be limiting punitive damage awards in most cases to three or four times the compensatory damages, and if they don’t, an appellate court probably will.

Post-Verdict: at this stage the dynamics have shifted in plaintiff's favor. McDonald’s will have to pay $640,000 plus interest unless the verdict is reversed on appeal. Why then would plaintiff settle for an amount less than $640,000? Because there is a chance the she could lose on appeal. Then she would have to retry the case with a different jury which means an uncertain outcome and additional litigation expense. As a result, the parties settled the case.

Final Thoughts

There are other factors to consider when evaluating the settlement value of a case: the costs of litigation, the possibility of having to pay the other side’s costs and attorney fees if you do not prevail,  the time value of money, etc.. There are also other costs that are harder to gauge:  the emotional toll of participating in a trial, the time commitment, added pressures on family and business colleagues, and much, much more.

I am a great believer in the benefits of settling disputes prior to trial. It requires a realistic view of the facts and the law by both parties. That view must be shaped by realistic assumptions. You cannot compare the strongest parts of your case with the weakest parts of your opponent’s case and expect to have a meeting of the minds.

Disputes happen but reasonable people can usually find ways to resolve them in a cost-effective manner. When they cannot even agree on a possible settlement range, settlement is not possible and the dispute will spill into court. Who will wipe up the mess? A jury of your "peers"-strangers really-who may not even know what it is like to drink hot coffee.

Lessons About Enforcing Settlements From the School of Hard Knocks

 

As a mediator, I am in the business of getting lawsuits settled, so I take special note of court opinions where a party tries to get out of a settlement by alleging such things as fraud, economic duress, and most recently in Starpoint Properties, LLC v. Namvar, a California Court of Appeal case, coercion. Early in my career I settled a lawsuit during trial but the plaintiff attempted to back out of the deal. It took several months and additional legal fees to finally get a court order to enforce the settlement. As a result, I like to report on “settlements gone bad” cases to illustrate how settlements can fall apart and help others learn from what I and others have learned from the school of hard knocks.

The Starpoint Properties case, involving allegation of breach of contract and fraud, was settled when the parties agreed that the lawsuit would be dismissed in exchange for the right to purchase certain real property owned by the defendants in Los Angeles. The settlement agreement also included a stipulation for entry of judgment, which provided that Starpoint would be entitled to judgment in the amount of $8,362,000, plus interest, against all of the defendants named in the complaint, if any one of four events was to occur. Additionally, the stipulation expressly stated that defendants had waived their right to appeal any judgment issued pursuant to the stipulation, as well as any right to receive notice that judgment would be entered pursuant to the stipulation. When negotiating the terms of the settlement agreement and the stipulation, all parties were represented by counsel.

After three of the four events listed in the settlement agreement and stipulation occurred, Starpoint filed the stipulation and judgment was entered ex parte.  Defendant’s attempted to set aside the judgment by alleging that Starpoint coerced them into entering the settlement agreement. However, the trial court found that the claim of coercion was unfounded, and denied the motion. Defendants then appealed but the Court of Appeal found the appeal was untimely; it also noted that the matter would have failed on the merits of the case. Finally, the Court awarded attorney fees to Starpoint as the settlement agreement provided that the prevailing party would be awarded attorney fees in any action to enforce the settlement agreement.

Lessons Learned

Perhaps the most important take-away from the Starpoint case is that settlement agreements have consequences, and the courts will enforce the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement, as it would for any contract. The court rejected many of the claims on appeal based upon the language of the settlement agreement. For example, the defendants claimed that the trial court erred in entering judgment against them on an ex parte basis, without giving them an opportunity to appear. The argument, however, was found to be without merit because appellants expressly waived their right to receive notice in the settlement agreement, and such waivers are valid under California law.

The Court of Appeal also noted other aspects of the settlement contract that could not be ignored: it expressly stated that the parties had entered into the agreement”voluntarily,” and “with full knowledge of its significance,” and that its terms had been “negotiated at arms’ length among sophisticated Parties represented by counsel.” Some may view such language as “boilerplate”, but unambiguous terms of a settlement agreement will be enforced by the courts. In this case, the Court of Appeal could not find any reason to overturn the order of the trial court-even in the face of a claim of coercion.

Three Yards and a Cloud of Dust: More X's and O's from the Competitive World of Litigation

 

I like to read and report on appellate court cases that illustrate the benefits of self-determination in the mediation process as opposed to court-imposed adjudication in the civil trial process. It may involve a little "Monday morning quarterbacking,"  but I don't consider it to be second quessing anybody but more like watching game film to learn from past competitions and prepare for the next contest.

Today I want to report on a new California Court of Appeal case involving a homeowner and a condominium owners’ association.  It addresses the voluntary dismissal of some but not all causes of action, the question of who is the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees, and the consequences of a fully executed settlement agreement that includes a waiver of known and unknown claims. These are typical issues in every lawsuit but looking at them from a “post-mortem” perspective can increase our capacity for pre-trial solutions.

WHAT HAPPENED

It is never a good sign when an appellate court admonishes one of the parties to get her “ducks in row,” but that is what happened in this condo case. The court stated:

 A party contemplating litigation to enforce the covenants, conditions, and restrictions of a condominium project should get the "ducks in a row." That is to say, such party should be ready to go forward procedurally and prove its case substantively. Failure to do so subjects the losing party to an award of attorney fees. Here, a condominium owner filed against a condominium association. In defending the suit, the Association incurred attorney fees of a quarter million dollars. Based on faulty reasoning, the owner dismissed eight of the ten causes of action on the eve of trial. She prevailed on no level whatsoever, let alone on a "practical level." But the trial court denied the Association any attorney fees, and the Association appealed. We conclude that the denial was an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. The condo owner did not realize her "litigation objectives" on these causes of action. The Association did realize its "litigation objectives" and was the prevailing party on a "practical level." It is entitled to attorney fees as mandated by the Legislature.

Dismissal

There are potential consequences when a lawsuit is dismissed either voluntarily, as was the case in the condo case above, or involuntarily due to some court action. Depending on the state statute, the court will determine which side is the prevailing party and award that party the costs of litigation and under certain conditions, attorney fees. In the condo case, the plaintiff may have to pay up to $250,000 in attorney fees to reimburse the condo association, the prevailing party. It should be noted that a trial court can also award litigation costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party after a civil trial.

When conducting a pre-trial risk assessment, I believe it is imperative that all parties to a lawsuit consider the possibility of having to pay not only their own costs and fees but also the costs and fees of the other side. Parties must be realistic about the risks posed by the prevailing party statutes, especially given the discretion courts are given in making the determination of who is the prevailing party.

Attorney Fees

In most states, such as California, attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party if there is a contractual or statutory basis for such an award. For example, many contracts have attorney fee provisions which provide that in the event there is litigation over the subject matter of the contract, the prevailing party will be awarded its attorney fees. Some states have enacted laws to advance a favored public policy that include attorney fee provisions to the prevailing party. In the condo case, for example, the condo association filed a motion pursuant to California Civil Code section 1354, subdivision (c), which provides: "In an action to enforce the governing documents" of a common interest development, "the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs."  

Litigants should be aware of the potential for having to pay the other side’s costs and attorney fees and conversely, that the other side may have to reimburse them if they prevail. Both sides of the issue should be considered when evaluating the risks and benefits of trial. Paying the other side’s attorney fees and costs is a bitter pill to swallow, especially if the issue was not fully evaluated and discussed prior to trial.

My friend at Construction Law Musings, Chris Hill, has a good post today on attorney fee provisions in construction contracts at www.constructionlawva.com.

Settlement Agreements

Settlement agreements generally contain very broad language to ensure that all claims and causes of action related to the issues in dispute are forever discharged and released. In California, Civil Code section 1542 provides that a person cannot release unknown claims. However, it is a common practice among lawyers to include a waiver of section 1542 so that the settlement and release agreement resolves all known and unknown claims that exists between the parties. This issue came up in the condo case.

The homeowner filed suit against the condo association in 2004 and settled the case in 2005, resulting in a settlement and release agreement that included a provision waiving all rights to known and unknown claims. The homeowner filed a second lawsuit against the condo association in 2008. In response the condo association argued that the homeowner’s claims were barred by the terms of the 2005 settlement agreement. The trial court agreed and so did the California Court of Appeal:

 Accordingly, we reject [homeowner's] argument that the 2005 release did not apply to unknown claims against Association that arose prior to the release. If an argument such as this were given currency, a release could never effectively encompass unknown claims. A releasor would simply argue that release of unknown or unsuspected claims applied only to known or suspected claims, making it ineffective as to unknown or unsuspected claims.

Settlement agreements are contracts. They are subject to the rules of evidence and are interpreted by the courts according to state contract law. They should be carefully drafted and reviewed before they are signed. You must be sure to precisely limit the release language to what is intended by both parties. For example, in the condo case the defendant condo association carved out of the release the homeowner’s obligation to pay monthly homeowner dues and assessments. Sometimes it is simply a point of negotiation, with the defendant wanting the release to be as broad as possible and the plaintiff wanting it to be as narrow as possible. Broad or narrow, both parties must think through the consequences of the release agreement so as to avoid any future surprises.  

As a mediator, I am an advocate for clarity, objectivity, reason, finality, and fairness. Cases like the condo case reinforce what I learned over a twenty-five year career as a trial lawyer: the outcome of a trial is never certain. The most effective trial lawyers are also effective problem solvers and counselors at law. They thoroughly consider each aspect of the dispute, they weigh the risks and rewards of trial, and they carefully explain all of the facets of the litigation to their clients. In my experience, well-prepared attorneys and well-informed clients can usually find a way to resolve a lawsuit prior to trial. Being part of the process that includes such preparation and perspective is one of the great privileges of being a mediator.

Resolving disputes through mediation is both challenging and rewarding. However, the certainty and finality of mediation also means there is less drama and truama when compared to a civil court trial. No "hail Mary" passes to win the game; no last second field goals to save the day. Instead the steady and sure process of mediation is more like the "Three Yards and a Cloud of Dust " reference that was used in the 1960's and '70's to describe the Ohio State Football teams of the legendary coach Woody Hayes, who famously said that when you throw the football three things can happen and two of them are bad(an incomplete pass or an interception). He preferred to run the football even if it meant a gain of only three yards and then a cloud of dust when the runner was tackled. A football team that strings together enough three yard gains (3.4, to be exact), will eventually cross the goal line. And so it is with mediation: parties that stick with the procees and grind it out will usually reach the goal of resolving their dispute, and when that happens, both sides win.

Conflict Resolution: A Lesson from Diogenes and Alexander the Great

 

Conflict is inevitable in our adversary system of justice. The term “adversary system” is defined as “the jurisprudential network of laws, rules, and procedures characterized by opposing parties who contend against each other for a result favorable to themselves.”(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition., p.49, italics added.) Since contention is a fundamental aspect of civil litigation, those of us who practice the art and science of mediation must find ways to help adversaries set aside their arsenals of advocacy skills and pick up, for a season, the tools of constructive problem solving.  

The Greek philosopher Diogenes once asked Alexander the Great what his plans were. Alexander answered that he planned to conquer and subjugate Greece. Then what? Diogenes asked. Alexander said that he planned to conquer and subjugate Asia Minor. And then? Alexander said that he planned to conquer and subjugate the world.

Diogenes asked the question again: What next? Alexander the Great told Diogenes that after all that conquering and subjugating, he planned to relax and enjoy himself. Diogenes responded: Why not save yourself a lot of trouble by relaxing and enjoying yourself now?

Mediators often employ the same line of questioning to the opposing sides in a civil dispute. Given the fact that victory in trial is not an absolute, a mediator might ask the following kinds of questions (slightly exaggerated for effect):

Mediator: If the case does not settle, what are your plans?

Trial Lawyer: I am going to use every conceivable resource to discover everything I need to know to win at trial.

Mediator: Then what?

Trial Lawyer: I am going to depose every witness I can round up.

Mediator: Then what?

Trial Lawyer: I am going to hire the best experts in the industry, and they will review all of the documents and all of the deposition transcripts in the case.

Mediator: And then what will you do?

Trial Lawyer: I will write a knock-out motion for summary judgment and if that does not work dozens of motions in limine to severely limit the other side’s evidence at trial.

Mediator: What next?

Trial Lawyer: I will prepare extensively for trial, hire trial consultants, develop fancy exhibits, and convince the jury with my winning arguments.

Mediator: If you win, what will you do next?

Trial Lawyer: I will take whatever measures are necessary to collect the judgment…unless the other side files an appeal.

Mediator: Why don’t you save yourself a lot of trouble and your client a lot of money now by engaging in serious settlement negotiations?  

Disputes happen; they are inevitable. Helping parties see beyond the conflict, the emotions, and the blame is what mediation is all about. In a variety of ways and means, a mediator will help the parties look objectively at the questions of liability, damages, costs, and collectability. The mediator will ask the parties to view the conflict, not through their eyes and experiences, but through the eyes and experiences of those who will sit in judgment, the judge and the jury. Often this point of view sheds new light on questions affecting every civil dispute:

  • What do you think you will get in monetary terms if you go to trial?

  • What are your chances of obtaining that outcome?

  • What will it cost you to get that outcome?

  • What are your chances of collecting the judgment?

Finally, another story about Alexander the Great and Diogenes: 

While Diogenes was conducting some research, Alexander anxiously asked, “How can I help you?” Diogenes replied simply: “Please step out of my light!”

 

 

 

 

 

Written Notice Provisions: A Rose By Any Other Name Would Smell So Sweet (To Owners)

 

My high school English teacher, Mrs. Clegg, did her best to instill in me a love for Shakespeare. She taught me to look for metaphors and similes in the great bard’s work, and to apply them to my life. Take Juliet’s famous line:”That which we call a rose by any other name would smell so sweet” (Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet). I took that to mean that names or titles mean less than the actual substance of a person’s character. Sadly, I never did learn to love Shakespeare, but I have come to recognize Shakespearean moments when, for example, two factions look at the same thing and draw completely different conclusions. Such will be the reaction of owners and contractors when they read Greg Opinski Construction v. City of Oakdale, a California Court of Appeal decision that was published two weeks ago.

For real property owners, the opinion, which is favorable to their interests, may have them thinking that written notice provisions by any other name would smell so sweet. On the other hand, for contractors and subcontractors, the opinion may be reminiscent of an alternative explanation of Shakespeare’s famous line which suggests it was an inside joke about the unsanitary bathroom conditions of the Rose Theatre, a local competitor of the bard’s Globe Theatre. Thus a “Rose” by any other name would smell so sweet.

The owner in the Opinski case rejected the contractor’s claims for time extensions because they were not presented in writing as required by the contract. Past appellate court decisions have given contractors a little wiggle room on oral modifications to the contract. Basically, if there was no prejudice to the owner, the written notice provisions were not strictly enforced. However, the court in Opinski held that contractors must strictly comply with written notice provisions. The contractor’s failure to do so resulted in a waiver of the claims.

LESSONS LEARNED

Contractors claiming additional time and money must strictly comply with written notice provisions. The written notice should strictly comply with the contract requirements in terms of formatting, form of delivery, and service on the owner's designated representative. The Opinski case should dispel the notion that the old “I know they knew” argument will hold up in court.

RON'S TOP TEN LIST: Things Your Mediator Wishes You Would Do So He Can Help You Settle Your Lawsuit

 

 

NUMBER ONE: Exchange with your opponent salient information about the case well in advance of the mediation. If you represent the plaintiff you may want to ask defense counsel what additional information, if any, is necessary for the defense to be fully prepared for the mediation. If you represent the defendant you will want to be sure the plaintiff’s counsel is fully informed about your view on the liability and damages issues. Last minute exchanges of information frustrate the mediation process because there will be insufficient time for the other side to analyze the information and review it with experts, management, and other people of influence.

 

NUMBER TWO:  Set a target settlement range prior to mediation. Your settlement range should be analyzed by considering your alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). Your BATNA "is the standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured. This is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your best interest to accept. (Robert Fisher & William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements Without Giving In ( Penguin Books 1991).

 

 NUMBER THREE: Analyze in advance your risk versus concession points. You should consider at what point the risks of trial outweigh the concessions you must give to reach a resolution of the dispute. These are your ROCR points (Risks Outweigh Concessions for Resolution), and their confluence leads to settlements.

 

NUMBER FOUR: Prepare an effective mediation brief. Your brief should focus on the key facts of the case pertaining to liability and damages. While briefs are very helpful to mediators they serve the dual purpose of informing your opponent about the strengths of your case. Some lawyers do not exchange their briefs with opposing counsel. I think that is a mistake. A well-written brief sent to opposing counsel well in advance of the mediation allows you to inform the decision makers on the other side about your view of the world. If there is some information for the mediator’s eye’s only, you can add a confidential section to the mediator’s brief. For example, you may have some information you intend to use at trial that you don’t want the opponent to know about but could be useful information for the mediator.

 

NUMBER FIVE: Prepare your client for the mediation. You should have a pre-mediation meeting with your clients to discuss your settlement strategy, the risks of trial, the costs of litigation, including attorneys fees and expert fees, the implications of a statutory offer to compromise and the possibility of paying the other side’s fees and costs, evidentiary problems and motions in limine that could limit your ability to put on your case, the possibility of an appeal and the length of time and the costs associated with an appeal, collectability issues, and any other fact that would help your client make an informed decision with regard to the settlement value of the case.  

 

NUMBER SIX: Ensure the presence of the decision makers. Nothing sinks a mediation faster than not having the captains on board and engaged in the process.

 

NUMBER SEVEN: Show respect for other parties. The objective in mediation is to find a solution to a problem. People who feel disrespected are generally more interested in saving face than they are in resolving the dispute. While you do not have to agree with the things that are being said by your opponent, you should show respect for the other side’s point of view.   

 

NUMBER EIGHT: Be willing to listen. Effective listening may be the greatest skill-set you can bring to the mediation. Unless you attempt to see things from the other side’s point of view, you will not be able to see your case from the most important vantage points: the jury box and the bench. After all, the judge and the jury are duty bound to carefully listen to the other side at trial; you should be equally engaged and attuned in mediation.

 

NUMBER NINE: Remain flexible. Enough said.

 

NUMBER TEN: Don’t hold on to unreasonable expectations. You should not expect to settle the case based on the terms you might receive on your best day of trial. You should go into the mediation with a settlement range based on a realistic risk analysis that considers the strengths and weaknesses of your case and even takes into account the things you cannot control, like an unfavorable jury, the exclusion of a key piece of evidence, or a disastrous witness.

 

A Judge's Grateful And Funny Response To A Settlement

 

Judges are people too. Some of them even have a sense of humor. Years ago Justice Sills of the California Court of Appeal began his opinion in a mechanic’s lien case I was handling with these words: “This case presents a real doozy of a puzzle in mechanic’s lien law.” At that point in my career I didn’t know that judges used words like doozy in their learned opinions.

Recently, as reported in the legal humor blog Lowering the Bar (and repeated in the Wall Street Journal Law Blog), Kentucky state judge Martin Sheehan penned a doozy of a ruling that expressed his feelings about the settlement of a case that had been set for trial in his courtroom. The judge wrote:

Such news of an amicable settlement [has] made this court happier than a tick on a fat dog because it is otherwise busier than a one legged cat in a sandbox and, quite frankly, would have rather jumped naked off a 12 foot step ladder into a five gallon bucket of porcupines than have presided over a two week trial . . which, no doubt, would have made the jury more confused ...and made the parties and their attorneys madder than mosquitoes in a mannequin factory.

Continuing his humorous theme, the judge concluded his ruling by asking his clerk to “engage the services of a structural engineer to ascertain if the return of the file to the clerk’s office will exceed the maximum structural load of the floors of said office.”

Over the years I have seen judges equally happy about the settlement of a case, although they were a tad more reserved about it than Judge Sheehan. But in my opinion their joy came from more than just the relief that the settlement helped to free up a busy court calendar or even the recognition that the settlement would result in cost-savings to the county. No, my sense of things is that judges really are people with hearts and feelings. They are public servants who are dedicated to serving people, and they know people are often best served when the fighting stops and healing begins. They know that parties who settle their lawsuits are happy as clams at high tide.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mediation:The Antidote to the Uncertainty of Trial

 

Mediation is the antidote to the uncertainty of trial and most often leads to the timely, cost-effective resolution of disputes. In mediation, the people with “skin in the game,” the litigants, not jurors, judges, or appellate court justices, decide how and when the conflict will end.  On the other hand, litigants who proceed through trial are subject to the rules of the court and the full power of the state to enforce court judgments and decrees. If an appeal is filed, the process of resolving the dispute may be extended for years.    

The uncertainty of trial and the power of the state were illustrated in Garbell v. Conejo Hardwood Floors, a recent decision published by the California Court of Appeals, where the jury did not view the expert testimony the way one of the parties expected. The trial court did not view the law the way the other party expected. And the appellate court took away the cost award, including consultants and experts fees, of the party that lost the case but was deemed the prevailing party by the trial court. The purpose of this post is to summarize the salient points of the decision and in the LESSONS LEARNED section below, apply them to a hypothetical mediation and pre-trial risk analysis.

Here’s what happened: The Garbells had an $822,000 fire loss at their home, only half of which was covered by insurance. The insurance company paid $424,000 to the Garbells for the covered part of the loss and filed a subrogation action against the flooring contractor who was accused of starting the fire. The homeowners also filed a claim against the flooring contractor to recover the $400,000 of personal property destroyed in the fire that was not covered by insurance. The flooring contractor settled with the insurance company in the subrogation action but defended itself against the claims of the homeowners at trial. The jury found that the damages were $822,000, with the flooring contractor being responsible for fifty-five percent of the loss and the homeowners being responsible for forty-five percent on comparative fault principles. . As a result, the trial court awarded $28,000 in damages to the homeowners, representing the net amount after the subrogation payment and the homeowners’ comparative fault were taken into account. In addition, the trial court awarded costs to the flooring contractor because the homeowners had rejected a $100,000 settlement offer from the flooring contractor and only received a net award of $28,000. Both sides appealed the judgment.

On appeal, Canejo Hardwood contended there was insufficient evidence for the Garbell’s expert to conclude that a carelessly discarded cigarette caused the fire and even if the fire was caused by a cigarette, there was no evidence that the cigarette belonged to one of its workers. Canejo Hardwood also argued that it did not have control over the garage where the fire started after its men left for the day. The Court of Appeal noted, “The jury disbelieved this theory. While we might have reached a different conclusion based upon the evidence, we do not second guess the jury. We therefore conclude there was sufficient evidence of causation to support the jury's finding of negligence.”

The Appellate Court also rejected the Garbell’s argument that the trial court miscalculated their damages by deducting the insurance payment they received after determining comparative fault for the total property loss. The court reached this decision following an extensive review of subrogation laws and the collateral source rule, with the court concluding there was no error in the damage calculation.

Finally, the Appellate Court did agree with the Garbell’s that the trial court erred in awarding costs to Canejo Floors. The court determined that for purposes of awarding costs, the trial court should have looked at the gross amount of the judgment-$452,000-instead of the net award of $28,000. Since the judgment of $452,000 exceeded the Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer to compromise, costs should not have been awarded to Canejo Floors, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of the motion for costs.

LESSONS LEARNED

A pre-trial risk analysis of the legal and economic implications of going to trial is always appropriate. You want to see if you can negotiate a settlement that is better than an uncertain result at trial. The term negotiators often use is BATNA: what is your best alternative to a negotiated agreement? In other words, what are your chances of getting a better result at trial than you can through negotiations. Here are a few things you might consider in a hypothetical pre-trial assessment:

·         Plaintiff has damages that exceed $822,000.

·         If plaintiff gets everything he wants, he will be awarded $398,000 after the insurance company gets compensated $424,000 on its subrogation claim.

·         Defendant offers to settle the case for $100,000.

·         Plaintiff does not want to accept the $100,000 but knows there may be a settlement range of $398,000 to $100,000. This is where a good mediator can help the parties bridge the gap.

·         How can Plaintiff justify taking less than $398,000 and convince the defendant to pay more than $100,000?

·         Plaintiff must realize that his claim could be reduced through comparative fault principles. Is it possible that a jury could find the plaintiff at fault for 45% of the $822,000 loss? If so, is there some percentage of your claim that you would discount to take this possibility into account? Is it possible that the jury could find the plaintiff entirely at fault because the defendant did not have control over the garage at all times?

·         Defendant must realize that it is possible that the jury will find that the plaintiff has no comparative fault. Is there some amount more than $100,000 that you would be willing to pay to take this into account?

·         If there is comparative fault, what is the likelihood that the court would deduct the subrogation payment from the net amount after the comparative fault calculation?

·         Even if you think there is no implicating evidence because the fire destroyed the evidence of the cause of the fire, what are the chances that a jury will believe the testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness?

·         Given these factors, is there a way to reach a compromise? If you are the defendant, do you want to spend more on experts and consultants when you realize you may not get your costs of litigation back because the plaintiff need only prove damages above your 998 offer when it is undisputed that the loss exceeded $822,000 and even after the subrogation claim is paid off, the plaintiff will still have a good shot at getting a damage award above $100,000.01? And if you are wrong, plaintiff will be the prevailing party so that you won’t get your costs back and there will be a chance you will have to pay the plaintiff’s costs

·         Is there an attorney fee provision that you should consider? What are the chances that the other side will be deemed the prevailing party? What are your chances of being the prevailing party? Do you want to take the risk of paying your own attorneys fees, and those of your opponent?

·         If there is an appeal, what are the chances of prevailing, how long will it take, and how much more money will you have to spend?

There is no doubt that some cases must be resolved by trial. This usually happens when the parties’ pre-trial valuations of the case are wildly disparate. But in most cases, reasonable, objective people can find a way to look at the legal and economic factors to find a way to reach a compromise. Sometimes the gap is closed when an additional factor is taken into account: the emotional toll of a trial on litigants, including the pressure felt by families, shareholders, and partners, and the diversion of time, money, and energy from the people and goals that matter most in life.

 

Settlement Negotiations and Interest-Based Bargaining

 

Most of my mediations involve traditional bargaining over money. Sometimes referred to as “positional bargaining,” the process looks something like this: Party A has a claim against Party B for breach of contract, negligence, etc. Party A wants money as compensation for the loss. Party B does not want to pay any money or at least not the amount being claimed. They attempt to settle the matter through numerous rounds of offers and counter-offers, with the mediator assisting the parties in the process.  Most often the matter will be settled, with Party A feeling he did not get enough money and Party B feeling he paid too much.

While the everyday world of most mediators who assist in the resolution of civil disputes involves traditional bargaining, the initial mediation training they receive focuses on interest-based bargaining which often results in thoughtful solutions for mutual gain. For example, an orange is held up and the story is told of two sisters who both want the fruit. The subsequent fight is elegantly resolved when the sisters begin to speak to each other about their interests, and they learn that one wants to eat the fruit and the other simply wants the peel as part of a recipe for dinner; they rejoice to learn that both of their interests could be met by carefully pealing the orange.

A similar example of resolving a dispute through interest- based bargaining is the story of sisters fighting over their deceased mother’s wedding ring. Family unity is wonderfully restored when the sisters start talking about what they really want: one wants to wear the ring and the other wants to remove the diamond from the ring and have it made into a necklace. The conflict is resolved when the one who wants to wear the ring decides to replace the diamond her sister wants with her own birthstone.  

While these stories nicely illustrate how family conflicts can be resolved, does interest-based bargaining actually work in the rough and tumble world of business disputes or personal injury claims? When there is a fight over money, can the parties fashion a resolution that involves more than money? The answer to that question is this: it depends. It depends if there is an ongoing relationship that both parties want to preserve. For example, in the construction industry, a construction dispute between a general contractor and a subcontractor could be resolved if the subcontractor expressed an interest that goes beyond a cash settlement and the contractor expressed an interest in preserving a relationship with a valued subcontractor. Perhaps the subcontractor would take less than he thinks he is owed if the general contractor agreed to give the subcontractor opportunities to bid on future work.

Interest-based bargaining can also be used to successfully resolve a business dispute where the parties have more than just money with which to bargain. The Facebook litigation between Mark Zuckerberg and his former Harvard colleagues, who claimed that Facebook was based on their idea for a social network called Connect U, is an example of this. It has been reported that the case was settled by Facebook paying $65 million, with $20 million paid in cash and $45 million being paid in the form of a stock swap for Connect U stock. This appears to have met Facebook’s interest in limiting its cash contribution to the deal while giving the Connect U people value in the form of Facebook stock which, if you follow the markets at all, turned out to be a good deal.

There may be situations in personal injury cases that would benefit from interest-based bargaining. Perhaps the plaintiffs are interested in preserving the memory of a loved one who is lost in a tragic accident or motivated to see that measures are taken to prevent such accidents in the future.  A defendant unable to meet the financial demands of such a plaintiff could expand the settlement potential of the case by addressing plaintiff’s non-monetary interests in the form of a memorial or some form of educational platform.

It is wise to think about the other side's interests, even in adversarial proceedings. The bottom line is that interest-based bargaining in business disputes or personal injury matters can work under certain circumstances. When a dispute arises the parties should consider whether there are non-cash considerations that could be explored as additional incentives to settle a dispute. 

Indemnity Contracts and the Duty to Defend: You mean I have to pay even if I was not negligent?

Benjamin Franklin's " Poor Richard's Almanack" had it right: "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure."  This was true for farmers in 1739 and it is true for lawyers and their clients in 2011. Not that Ben held farmers and lawyers in equal esteem,as you may notice when reading the following Franklin favorite: "A country man between two lawyers is like a fish between two cats."

Given our adversary system of jurisprudence in America, I would acknowledge that conflicts between lawyers can get downright messy. When a dispute arises, the parties have to figure out what to do about their rights and obligations under the terms of the contract, and if they cannot resolve the issues, they hire lawyers (and sometimes mediators) to help them resolve the dispute, and if they are unable to do so, a trial court judge may be called upon to decide who is right, once and for all, unless there is an appeal, then appellate justices may be asked to sort it all out. Such was the case in Kirk Crawford, et. al. v. Weather Shield Mfg.(2008) 44 Cal. 4th 541, a breach of the duty to defend case between a contractor and a subcontractor. Ben Franklin might have summarized the dispute like this:

A duty to defend provision between two lawyers is like a fish between two cats. 

The question presented in the Crawford case was whether, under the terms of the subcontract, the subcontractor was obliged to defend the general contractor/developer for construction defects allegedly caused by the subcontractor even though (1) the jury ultimately found the subcontractor was not negligent, and (2) the parties accepted an interpretation of the subcontract that gave the builder no right of indemnity unless the subcontractor was negligent.This was a huge issue in the building industry and here's where the two cats fighting over a fish comes into the picture. Actually, as you will see, the two cats attracted a bunch of other cats because this particular fish was so big.

The general contractor  was represented by an excellent  law firm and its position on appeal was supported by three other law firms who, in representing the interests of general contractors, filed amicus curiae or friend of the court  briefs. Such briefs are filed by people who want to weigh in on a case that could later affect their interests.  The subcontractor was also well represented by a fine law firm, and with  five amicus curiae briefs filed by other law firms representing the interests of various subcontractor groups. 

 The California Supreme Court summarized the defense and indemnity provisions of the subcontract as follows:

We focus on the particular language of the subcontract. Its relevant terms imposed two distinct obligations on Weather Shield. First, Weather Shield agreed "to indemnify and save [JMP] harmless against all claims for damages to persons or to property and claims for loss, damage and/or theft ... growing out of the execution of [Weather Shield's] work." Second, Weather Shield made a separate and specific promise "at [its] own expense to defend any suit or action brought against [JMP] founded upon the claim of such damage ... loss, ... or theft." (Italics added.)

When the home owners filed suit against the contractor for a variety of construction defects and the contractor filed a cross complaint against its subcontractors, Weather Shield took the position that it was not responsible for the window leaks, and refused to defend or indemnify the contractor. This kind of decision is made every day by subcontractors. But this is where the "ounce of prevention" comes into play. Instead of scrambling around to decide what rights and duties are owed at the commencement of litigation, it would be much better if some time (and even attorneys fees) were invested in the contract phase to have a clear understanding of the terms and conditions of the contract. If you want the job badly enough, maybe it will not bother you that you may be taking on the contractor's defense obligations, even if you are not negligent. The point is to make an informed risk analysis at the beginning of the project to avoid suprises later.

The contractor JMP and the other subcontractors, except Weather Shield and the framing subcontractor, settled with the home owners before trial for an amount in excess of a million dollars.That left the contractor to press its cross complaint against Weather Shield, the window manufacturer and supplier, and the framer who installed them. The jury found that the framer was liable for a million dollars in damages, and that Weather Shield was not responsible.

Since Weather Shield was not negligent it had no indemnity obligations, but the contractor JDM claimed Weather Shield had a duty to defend the contractor against the window claims from the commencement of the litigation. In essence, the contractor said to Weather Shield, you refused to defend us in violation of the subcontract, and we want to be reimbursed $131,000 for the cost of defending your portion of the window issue and we want another $46,000 for attorneys fees we spent trying to force you to pay us our defense costs. The Court held  Weather Shield had an immediate duty to assume the contractor's defense as soon as the case was tendered to it. The Court said:

By virtue of these statutory provisions, the case law has long confirmed that, unless the parties' agreement expressly provides otherwise, a contractual indemnitor has the obligation, upon proper tender by the indemnitee, to accept and assume the indemnitee's active defense against claims encompassed by the indemnity provision. Where the indemnitor has breached this obligation, an indemnitee who was thereby forced, against its wishes, to defend itself is entitled to reimbursement of the costs of doing so.

 

Here, the subcontract at issue not only failed to limit or exclude Weather Shield's duty "to defend" JMP, as otherwise provided by subdivision 4 of section 2778, it confirmed this duty. In language similar to that of the statute, the subcontract explicitly obligated Weather Shield both to indemnify JMP against certain claims, and "at [its] own expense to defend" JMP against "any suit or action ... founded upon" such claims. (Italics added.) The duty "to defend" expressly set forth in Weather Shield's subcontract thus clearly contemplated a duty that arose when such a claim was made, 8 and was not dependent on whether the very litigation to be defended later established Weather Shield's obligation to pay indemnity. 

LESSONS LEARNED

Most contracts will have at least two provisions in anticipation of third party claims. There will be an indemnity provision which covers losses caused by the subcontractor's negligence. There may also be a duty to defend provision which may or may not be triggered as soon as the third party claim is made, depending on the contract language. Both provisions deserve an "ounce of prevention" in the contracting phase of a project. These indemnity and defense provisions can be complicated, and they can vary in terms of what is required and when it is required. Don't assume what you see in your subcontracts is just "standard stuff". Words in a contract have meaning, and they may mean something you did not anticipate at the beginning of the project. In this case, the "pound of cure" for Weather Shield included the cost of paying for its own defense, the cost of reimbursing the general contractor for its defense of the window issue, and the cost of paying the attorneys fees incurred by the contractor to prosecute the duty to defend claim.

FINAL NOTE

California Civil Code 2782(c) provides that construction contracts for residential construction entered into after January 1, 2006, that include provisions that require subcontractors to indemnify builders and their agents against liability for claims for construction defects are unenforceable to the extent the claims arise out of the negligence of the builder or its agents.

To Kill a Compromise: What Capitol Hill and All Disputants Can Learn From Atticus Finch

President Obama, House Speaker Boehner, and other Washington politicians are engaged in budget and debt ceiling negotiations that affect each of us but, sadly, we hear a lot of the same old blame game, and not nearly enough about compromise and resolution. Both sides seem to be locked in their positions which does not leave much room for compromise.

Every lawyer's hero, Atticus Finch, the wise and ethical lawyer in To Kill a Mockingbird, has this conversation with his young daughter, Scout, about compromise:

Atticus Finch: Do you know what a compromise is?

Scout: Bendin' the law?

Atticus Finch: Uh, no. It's an agreement reached by mutual consent. Now, here's the way it works. You concede the necessity of goin' to school, we'll keep right on readin' the same every night, just like we always have. Is that a bargain?

Atticus also taught Scout how to get along with folks:

If you just learn a single trick, Scout, you'll get along a lot better with all kinds of folks. You never really understand a person until you consider things from his point of view... Until you climb inside of his skin and walk around in it.

Atticus's counsel is good for politicians and for ordinary folks embroiled in disputes, large and small: Try to see the dispute through the eye's of your adversary. Social scientists have found that objectivity does not come to human beings naturally. In fact, we seemed to be pre-wired with certain propensities that make it difficult to get past our particular view of the world. Here are a couple of their findings regarding human nature:

ATTRIBUTION ERRORS

When we succeed, we generally attribute success internally to personal skills and gifts. When a rival succeeds, we tend to believe it was do to external factors such as luck. When we fail or make a mistake, we will more likely use situational factors rather than blame ourselves. When others fail or make mistakes, however, we will often assume it is due to internal factors such poor character, laziness, or other inherent traits .

REACTIVE DEVALUATION

Humans have a hard time receiving information from their adversaries. In fact, the perceived source of the information has a lot to do with our perception of it. We discount whatever the other side offers, even if it is favorable. In one study from the 1980's, people were asked to react to a proposal that the Soviet leader Gorbachev made to reduce nuclear warheads by 50 percent. When the proposal was attributed to Ronald Reagan, 90% of Americans reacted favorably. When the proposal was attributed to an unnamed third-party, 80% thought it was a good idea. But when the proposal was attributed to Gorbachev, only 44% of Americans thought it was a good idea.

And so I say to President Obama, Speaker Boehner, their respective party loyalists, and to all of us who are trying to resolve a dispute: compromise is not "bendin'"the law. It is an agreement by mutual consent. It is about getting the job done. It is about putting aside pre-conceived notions about the other side's motivation and character; it's about acknowledging that both sides have strengths and weaknesses in their positions; it is about setting aside words of conflict in favor of words of hope and healing.

Compromise begins when we climb inside the skin of our adversary and walk around in it. Absent that minimal effort we most likely will kill any hope of a compromise.

Disclosure Obligations of Arbitrators

Arbitrator is defined in my dog-eared college dictionary as "one who is chosen to settle differences between two parties to a controversy." My Black's Law Dictionary, my desk-mate of thirty years, adds an important word-disinterested- to the meaning of "arbitrator," while expounding on the legal aspects of the word: "A private, disinterested person, chosen by the parties to a disputed question, for the purpose of hearing their contention, and giving judgment between them; to whose decision (award) the litigants submit themselves either voluntarily, or, in some cases, compulsorily."

In California, the Code of Civil Procedure refers to a "neutral arbitrator" (section 1280(d)). and while the word neutral is not expressly defined in the statute, Black's tells us the meaning of the word:

Indifferent;unbiased;impartial;not engaged on either side;not taking an active part with either of the contending sides.

Under California law, a neutral arbitrator "shall dislose all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial," including the following:

  • Any ground specified for disqualification of a judge.
  • Any arrangement or discussion regarding employment or services as a dispute resolution neutral with a party to the proceeding.
  • Any matter required to be disclosed by the ethics standards for neutral arbitrators.
  • The names of the the parties and lawyers to all prior or pending collective bargaining cases.
  • Prior attorney-client relationships with a party or lawyer in the arbitration proceeding.
  • Any professional or significant personal relationship between the arbitrator or the spouse or minor child of the arbitrator and any party or lawyer in the arbitration.

Each state has similar disclosure laws to ensure arbitrators are, indeed, neutral, including Texas, where a $22 million arbitration award was thrown out last week by the Fifth District Court of Appeals because of undisclosed social contacts between the arbitrator and the lawyer representing the plaintiff. The same thing happened a few years ago in a California Fourth District Court of Appeals case where the arbitrator previously represented various entities in a complicated insurance syndicate that were connected to the defendant appearing before him in the arbitration. I invite you to read both of these cases, but for my purposes here I will only summarize the alleged conflicts of interests to illustrate the simple (the Texas case) and subtle (the California case) ways such conflicts can arise.

TEXAS CASE

The Texas Court considered the following facts regarding the relationship between the arbitrator and plaintiff's counsel:

  • The relationship began in 1994 when the lawyer was a clerk to a judge in the courthouse where the arbitrator was serving as a magistrate judge.
  • The arbitrator and the lawyer had a social relationship that included dinners, sporting events, Christmas gifts, numerous business calls and e-mails.
  • The arbitrator and lawyer acted as "strangers" when they introduced themselves to each other at the arbitration.

CALIFORNIA CASE

 The arbitrator and his law firm represented "Protections and Indemnity Clubs" which provided insurance and other business services to shipowners and others involved in the maritime industry. The P&I Clubs  procured reinsurance support from syndicates of Lloyd's of London. The respondent in the arbitration proceedings was insured through Lloyd's syndicates, and a representative of Lloyd's was present during the arbitration.

Final Thoughts

In the Texas case, the arbitrator did not recall the extent of the social contacts over a 15 year relationship until his memory was refreshed by his wife after the arbitration was concluded. However, the standard for vacating an arbitration award in Texas is whether a party's rights were prejudiced by the "evident partiality" of the arbitrator. An arbitrator exhibits evident partiality if "he does not disclose facts that might, to an objective observer, create a reasonable impression of the arbitrator's partiality."  

In the California case, the arbitrator apparently did not realize that various insurance syndicates that he and his law firm represented had some kind of connection to a party to the arbitration. However, when a Lloyd's lawyer began to monitor the arbitration, the arbitrator did not make any inquiries to see if there were any conflicts with his existing client base. In the end the California Appellate Court felt that a reasonable person could doubt the impartiality of an arbitrator who provided legal services to an insurance group that may be responsible for paying some part of the potential arbitration award. 

There are any number of reasons for failing to disclose certain facts that have nothing to do with the moral character of the arbitrator, including time constraints, faulty memory, and staffing issues. However, these cases illustrate the caution proposed arbitrators must exhibit prior to the arbitration. From simple facts about social contacts to subtle facts about complicated business structures, arbitrators must spend sufficient time to discover and disclose facts that could affect the perception their impartiality. Once such facts are disclosed, the parties can make an informed decision about selecting the arbitrator. And oftentimes, the parties will select an arbitrator despite the disclosures because of the arbitrator's reputation for honesty, integrity, and fairness-the hallmarks of all good arbitrators. 

 

Predicting Risk is the Essence of Good Lawyering

Trial advocacy is often dramatized in movies and television. We see persuasive lawyers depicted in emotional closing argument scenes and intense lawyers in those "gotcha" moments of searing cross-examination. But truly great trial lawyers have a skill not seen in the courtroom, let alone on the silver screen: the ability to predict the outcome of a trial before it starts.

Clients come to lawyers asking simple questions about complicated problems: What is the risk? What are my chances? Do I have a case? Clients want to know what will happen to them if they proceed through trial. And they should be worried, according to the late Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., because the power of the state to enforce court judgments and degrees is looming over every trial. Prediction, said he, is the object of the study of law:

When we study the law… we are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason why it is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is to be feared.The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts. (The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897)

A recent California Court of Appeals case exemplifies both the power of the state to enforce judgments and the important role of risk analysis in civil litigation, and it also stands for an important principle of law, which I will address first.

In Gunderson v. Wall, a jury awarded plaintiff $1.7 million in compensatory damages and $800,000 in punitive damages against Wall and Welded Fixtures, Inc. The defendants paid the judgment and filed an appeal. In a November 2009  unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the compensatory damages award, but ruled there was insufficient evidence to support the punitive damages. (Click here to read the unpublished opinion.) The plaintiff voluntarily repaid the $800,000, representing the punitive damage award. However, the defendants filed a motion in the trial court seeking restitution of the interest that had accrued on the punitive damage payment during the time of the appeal. The trial court denied the motion, finding the defendant acted inequitably in response to plaintiff's post-judgment efforts to collect the judgment. Defendant filed an appeal, and the court of appeal affirmed the decision not to reimburse the defendants the accrued interest. As a result of this case, parties need to be certain they have acted reasonably in the post-judgment process if they intend to ask the court for equitable considerations, such as repayment of interest on a reversed judgment.

The Gunderson opinion and its unpublished companion opinion provide some practical insight into Justice Holmes' statements about the power of the state over litigants and the importance of risk analysis, or prediction.  

PREDICTION AND THE POWER OF THE STATE

  • Will you proceed through trial for the chance of being awarded punitive damages? In California, you will have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that someone committed malice, oppression, or fraud, and if you have a corporate defendant, that a corporate officer or managing agent was involved in the misconduct (Civil Code 3294). The jury will probably be instructed that plaintiff must prove the conduct was despicable which means conduct that was so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.  In Gunderson, the jury awarded punitive damages, but the appellate court said there was insufficient evidence to support the award.
  • Your risk analysis should consider the impact of potential motions in limine on the evidence you intend to introduce at trial. In the 2009 Gunderson opinion, for example, one of the defendants asserted his fifth amendment right against self incrimination. The trial court then issued an order that precluded the defendant from presenting any evidence or cross-examining any witnesses at trial. This order was reversed on appeal, giving the defendant the right to a new trial. This also brings up the need for predicting the likelihood and expense of an appeal and a second trial.
  • Gunderson used the power of the state to enforce the original judgment which included writs of execution and the installation of a receiver at defendant Welded Fixtures. The court also issued a writ of body attachment requiring defendant Wall to personally appear to answer questions about the loss of computers and financial data at Welded Fixtures.

Prediction, then, is an important element in the practice of law. It is not enough, however, to merely predict the outcome of the trial.  Each aspect of the trial has parts and subparts that must be analyzed, including the possibility of an appeal and a new trial, the costs and time associated with the litigation, and the likelihood of collecting the judgment. Trial lawyers who analyze and explain these risks to their client are the best of the best. They are true counselors at law and trusted advisers to their clients.

 

 

Enforcing Settlement Agreements: Who Pays Attorney Fees?

Settlement agreements are contracts.They are subject to the rules governing the formation and enforcement of contracts. Each settlement agreement should be drafted to respond to the particular law, facts, and risks of the case. This is not be a simple "cut and paste" job.

If a settlement agreement is breached, a lawsuit can be filed to enforce the terms of the settlement. While there are reasons not to have an attorney fee provision in some commercial contracts, settlement agreements should have attorney fee provisions, in my view. An attorney fee provision is a deterrent to any party who may want to rescind a settlement agreement, as the losing party would have to pay the other side's attorney fees.This increases the risk of trying to undo a settlement and helps the parties maintain what they bargained for: the resolution of a dispute.

A recent California Court of Appeals case addresses attorney fees and choice of law provisions in settlement agreements. (Click here to read the case.) In the Aronson v. Advanced Cell Technology, the settlement agreement memorialized  the settlement of a lawsuit that had been filed in Massachusetts and included a provision that stated it would be enforced according to Massachusetts law.  The attorney fee provision provided that the Plaintiffs in the Massachusetts action would be entitled to attorney fees in connection with the enforcement of the settlement agreement. The agreement did not provide for any reciprocal recovery for the defendant in the event of a dispute.

The Massachusetts law conflicts with California Civil Code section 1717 which provides attorney fees to the prevailing party, plaintiff or defendant, even though the contract may specify that only one of them is entitled to attorney fees.The Massachusetts law, on the other  hand, does not provide reciprocity to the left out party so that only the named party would be entitled to attorney fees in the event an enforcement action were taken.

In Aronson, the plaintiffs in the Massachusetts action filed suit in California to enforce the settlement agreement. The lawsuit was later dismissed without prejudice, and the defendant moved for an award of attorney fees in the sum of $645,000. The defendant claimed it was the prevailing party because the case was dismissed. The trial court denied the motion on the basis of Civil Code section 1717(b)(2) which says there is no prevailing party when there is a voluntary dismissal. The defendant argued that this exception under California law does not apply because the settlement agreement was to be governed by Massachusetts law. However, under Massachusetts law, the defendant was not entitled to attorney fees because the settlement agreement only specified the plaintiff as the party entitled to attorney fees. To that point, defendant argued that Civil Code section 1717 actually applied to that aspect of the case so that the attorney fee provision was reciprocal. In essence, the defendant wanted California law to apply to one aspect of the settlement agreement and Massachusetts law to apply to another aspect of the settlement agreement. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying the motion for attorney fees and ordered the defendant/appellant to pay the plaintiffs/respondents' cost of appeal.

Lessons Learned

  • While the opinion is not earth shaking, it does illustrate, once again, that the drafting of settlement agreements should not be a simple "cut and paste" job.
  • Caution must be used when agreeing to a choice of law provision. Each state has its own laws which could result in unanticipated consequences.
  • Before agreeing to a choice of law provision outside of your jurisdiction you should attempt to learn how the other state's laws could affect critical terms in your settlement agreement.

Other Points of Interest

The scope of the release is also an important consideration. From the defense perspective, the release should be broad as possible to include any and all causes of actions and claims. The plaintiff, of course, will want the release to be drafted as narrowly as possible so that only those rights that are at issue in the litigation are released. In construction defect cases, the owner will only want to release patent or obvious defects and reserve rights with respect to unknown claims or conditions. Similarly, the owner will not want the release to include any warranties that would otherwise be available under the terms of the construction contract or purchase agreement..  

A New California Case About Attorney Fees

California's public policy encourages the settlement of civil disputes. One way of doing so is Code of Civil Procedure section 998, a statue that shifts the risk of litigation to the party who rejects a pre-trial settlement offer but fails to obtain an award greater then the rejected offer. The statute gives the trial court the authority to award costs, including attorney fees and expert witness fees, under certain circumstances.

The statute provides an incentive to settle by increasing the potential exposure to paying the other side's litigation costs to the party contemplating a settlement offer. If the plaintiff's 998 offer is rejected, the defendant faces additional costs if the plaintiff is awarded a higher amount than the rejected offer; if the defendant's offer is rejected, the plaintiff could win the case, but if the damages award is less than the rejected offer, the plaintiff could be ordered to pay the defendant's litigation costs. Therefore, it is possible to win at trial but still lose the battle of who pays the freight of taking the case all the way through trial.

The California Court of Appeals published a case two days ago that adds clarity to the issue of costs and attorney fees under a section 998 offer. (Click here to read Martinez v. Metropolitan Transit Authority.) The Metropolitan Transit Authority made a settlement offer under section 998 which stated: "[MTA] hereby offers to Compromise the above-captioned matter for the total sum of $2501.00, with each party bearing their own costs."  Plaintiff accepted the offer but subsequently filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to certain applicable statutes and argued that the section 998 offer did not preclude her from requesting attorney fees because the offer only referred to "costs" and made no mention of attorney fees. MTA argued that that under Code of Civil Procedure 1033.5 (a)(10)(B), the term "costs" includes statutory attorney fees.

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, stating "statutory attorney's fees are an item of cost pursuant to CCP section 1033.5 (a)(10)(b)...and are therefore included in the defendant's section 998 offer, which states 'each side to bear their own costs.'" The Court of Appeal affirmed.

This circumstance calls for another "bright line rule." Unless the offer expressly states otherwise, an offer of monetary compromise under section 998 that excludes "costs" also excludes attorney fees. 

BEST PRACTICES

This case focuses on a statutory attorney fee request. Would the result have been any different if the attorney fees request was made pursuant to a contract provision? The Court did not address this squarely but did make the following observation: 

Allowable costs under [CCP]1032 are specified in section 1033.5. Section 1033.5, subdivision(a)(10) provides that attorney fees are allowable costs under 1032 when authorized by contract, statute, or law. Because attorney fees are costs under section 1033.5 it follows that when a section 998 offer provides that each party will bear its own costs the word "costs" refers to all costs described in section 1033.5, including attorney fees.

This case is a reminder that we should carefully draft our section 998 offers so that they clearly define the intended terms of the offer. It took an opinion from a court of appeal before the plaintiff in a $2500 case gave up her claim for attorney fees (assuming she does not take it to the Supreme Court of California).

While it now appear evident that costs include attorney fees, it would be a good practice to include in 998 offers a statement that each side will bear its own costs and attorney fees. That way there is no ambiguity about the intent behind the 998 offer as it relates to costs.

The Path of the Law is No Joking Matter

Lawyer jokes. Many lawyers are offended by them. While they are sometimes offensive, they are often humorous, and some even have an element of truth to them, like the one below:

A judge tells the taxi driver to take him to the halls of justice." Where are they?"asked the driver.

"You mean to say that you don't know where the courthouse is?" asked the incredulous judge.

"The courthouse? Of course I know where that is," replied the driver. "But I thought you said you wanted to go to the halls of justice."

Stepping up from the world of jokes and tall tales to dramatic moments at the movies, we hear Paul Newman's character saying in The Verdict , "The court exists to give 'em a chance at justice."

We can pass off such views as merely being an attempt at humor or entertainment. However, we should take pause when similar sounding statements are made by credentialed professionals like the great Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States for 30 years, who is reported to have said to one young lawyer who entered his courtroom:

"This is a court of law young man, not a court of justice!"

While such statements seem shocking, how can justice always be perfectly administered by the imperfect men and women of our legal system, including lawyers, judges, and jurors? How can even well-meaning people always accurately apply the common law that has evolved over hundreds of years and the modern statutory law enacted by the competing interests of political bodies? Even though we have the best legal system in the world, is it reasonable to expect that justice can always be served given the indeterminate character of language and the changing mores of a diverse population? Justice Arthur Gilbert of the California Court of Appeals recently gave a speech based on the supposition that our expectations that the law will provide a fair measure of predictability and certainty is, in many cases, an illusion.

If these things are true, then, one of the most important attributes for lawyers is the ability to predict the outcomes of trials. In a famous law review article entitled The Path of the Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., two years before his appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote about the awesome power of the state to enforce the judgments of courts and the important role lawyers have in trying to predict what will happen at trial:

When we study the law we are not studying a mystery but a well known profession. We are studying what we shall want in order to appear before judges, or to advise people in such a way as to keep them out of court. The reason this is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of the public force is intrusted to judges in certain cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much stronger then themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger should be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts. (The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Review 457 (1897))

Most civil cases settle before trial. In California state courts, about 90 percent of the civil cases are settled prior to trial, and in Federal Court, the rate is closer to 95 percent. However, those who do not settle their cases before trial do not necessarily do better in court. In fact, a recent study has shown a propensity for decision errors when offers of settlement are rejected. Plaintiffs committed decision errors, receiving an award at trial that is less than or equal to the last offer made by defendants, in 61.2 percent of the cases in the study. Defendants made decision errors, having to pay damage awards to plaintiffs that were greater than or equal to the last demand made by plaintiffs, in 24.3 percent percent of the cases in the study. However, it should be noted that the mean cost of the error for plaintiffs was $43,000 while the defendants, when they made a mistake, the mean cost was $1,140,000.

Trial lawyers must be more than predicting machines, they must be effective counselors who explain not only the chances of winning or losing, but also explain what can happen when "justice", at least their clients' view of justice, is not served in court. What are the practical consequences of losing, what can happen if you win but are not deemed the prevailing party by the court, are there litigation risks that are not obvious to a layman? What happens when offers of settlement are rejected and the result at trial is not as good as the rejected offer? All of these questions must be explored well in advance of trial. 

A recent unpublished case in California, illustrates the unpredictable path of the law: A trial over the purchase of real property resulted in a finding by the trial court that neither side performed their duties under the purchase agreement. Nevertheless, the defendant filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees and was awarded $538,884. On appeal the plaintiff asked, in essence, how could the defendant be the prevailing party when the trial court said he did not perform his duties, and when the he voluntarily dismissed his cross-complaint?  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, stating that the defendant was the prevailing party under the laws and facts of the case.

Lawyer jokes can be funny, but there is nothing funny about the unanticipated consequences of a trial. The power of the courts to enforce their judgments and decrees is no laughing matter, either. That is why I am such a proponent of mediation. It is a dispute resolution process that allows the parties to decide, not judges or juries, what is in their best interests, according to the best predictions their lawyers can make. 

A Hard Lesson About Settlement Agreements

Settlement agreements should not be the product of a cookie cutter operation. They must be carefully crafted to fit the laws and facts of the case. Considerable thought should be given to the scope of the release language in the agreement. We are again reminded of these fundamental principles by the unfortunate result in a California Court of Appeals case called Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hospital, a case in which the appellate court apologetically reached its conclusion while asking the California Supreme Court to reconsider a common law rule regarding releases that led to a very harsh result. 

The facts of the case are very sad: an infant suffered irreversible brain damage when his "bilirubin" reached toxic levels. In the medical malpractice action against the pediatrician and hospital, the parents of the child settled with the doctor for $1 million, the limits of his malpractice insurance, in exchange for a release of liabiity.  The trial court ruled that the settlement did not meet the standard of good faith under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6, because it was grossly disproportianate to the doctor's potential exposure in the case. Nevertheless, the parents and doctor decided to go through with the settlement.

The case was tried to a jury, which found both the hospital and the doctor negligent, and awarded damages of $78,000 for past medicals, $250,000 for noneconomic damages, $82 million for future medicals, and $13 million for loss of future earnings. Apportioning fault, the jury found the hospital was 40% negligent, the doctor 55% negligent, and the parents 5% negligent. The trial court entered judgment which declared the hospital was jointly and serverally liable for 95% of all economic damages and severally liable for its 40% share of noneconomic damages.

The hospital appealed, claiming that the release and settlement agreement with the doctor acted as a release of the hospital's joint and several liabilty for economic damages. The hospital argued that in cases where there is a single injury:

Under the common law release rule, a release for consideration of one tortfeasor operates as a release of the joint and several liability of the other joint tortfeasors.

The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the judgment of the trial court as to the hospital's joint and several liabilty for the economic damages. The judgment was affirmed insofar as it imposed several liability on the hospital for $250,000. Unless the California Supreme Court grants review of the case and decides to change the common law rule that led to this unintended outcome, the settlement and release agreement with the doctor wiped out $95 million, money that the jury felt was necessary to care for the future medical and finanicial needs of the child.

Lessons Learned

1. The Court noted that plaintiff could have avoided the result had the settlement agreement contained a covenant not to sue agreement rather than a release of liabilty. That way there would not have been a release of all who were potentially jointly and severally liable, only a promise that the party paying the money would not be subject to future collection efforts.

2. Plaintiffs must be very cautious about the scope of the release. Be sure you are releasing only those rights you intend to let go.

 

 

Facebook Settlement Upheld By Ninth Circuit

The Facebook litigation has been resolved...again. It was first resolved by way of settlement after a day of mediation. Then the Winklevoss twins claimed the settlement agreement was not enforceable on the grounds of fraud. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in affirming the decision of the district court: "For whatever reason, they [the Winklevosses] now want to back out [of the settlement]. Like the district court, we see no basis for allowing them to do so. At some point, litigation must come to an end.That point has now been reached." (Click here to read the case.)

I posted an article about this case on March 4, 2011. (See: The Social Network: Communications During Mediation Are Not In The Public Domain.) Based upon the questions of the Court during oral argument, it appeared the Winklevosses were waging an uphill battle. (See March 4 post featuring video of the hearing.) I was right.

The Ninth Circuit summarized the case as follows:

After a day of negotiations, Connect U, Facebook and the Winklevosses signed a handwritten , one-and-a-third page "Term Sheet & Settlement Agreement' (the Settlement Agreement). The Winkelvosses agreed to give up Connect U in exchange for cash and a piece of Facebook. The parties agreed that the Settlement Agreement was "confidential," " binding" and "may be submitted into evidence to enforce [it]. The Settlement Agreement also purported to end all disputes between the parties.

What struck me most about the opinion is how well the Court was able to simplify a complex case using plain English. I was also impressed  how important it is for clients to know what they are getting into when they sign a release. Courts will interpret release language broadly to effectuate the public policy that encourages settlements. In this case, "the Settlement Agreement grants 'all parties' 'mutual releases as broad as possible'; the Winklevosses 'represent and warrant' that '[t]hey have no further right to claim against Facebook' and 'no further claims against Facebook & its related parties.'"

Finally, it is important to point out the key role the confidentiality agreement had in the reasoning of the Court. The Winklevosses attempted to demonstrate fraud in the inducement of the settlement agreement by introducing evidence of what Facebook said during the mediation. The district court would not consider the evidence because of the protections afforded by the confidentiality agreement.

I'll end this post with the Court's matter of fact assessment of how all of this came down:

The Winkelvosses are not the first parties bested by a competitor who then seek to gain through litigation what they were unable to achieve in the marketplace. And the courts might have obliged, had the Winkelvosses not settled their dispute and signed a release of all claims against Facebook. With the help of a team of lawyers and a financial advisor, they made a deal that appears quite favorable in light of recent market activity.

Chief Judge Kozinski authored the opinion. It's a classic.  

 

 

 

Even if You Win at Trial You May Not be the Prevailing Party

If you win your lawsuit, you can make the loser pay your attorney's fees, right?  In California (and in most states) the answer to that questions depends on whether there is a statute or a contract provision that provides something like, "The prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney's fees." "Good," you think to yourself, "My contract has such a provision, so if I win my lawsuit I can make the other side pay my attorney's fees." Not so fast, pal. It is usually not that simple. The question of who pays can be "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," to borrow a phrase from Winston Churchill. 

When it comes to "who pays," the California Appellate Courts often use the phrase "good news bad news" when addressing prevailing party law under Civil Code section 1717. As in, the good news is you won the case, the bad news is the loser does not have to pay your attorney's fees. Section 1717(a) provides:

In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing  on the contract...shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. 

But what does it mean to be the "prevailing party"? In cases where there is a "simple unqualified win, " as noted by the California Supreme Court in the Hsu case (1995), getting an award of attorney's fees is not that difficult. But what if there are mixed results? You win on some but not all of your causes of action. You defeat most but not all of the plaintiff's claims. Who is the prevailing party then? Unless you are absolutely certain of a simple unqualified win, you must be aware of the potential consequences of a trial with mixed results. 

This week the Court of Appeals published another "good news bad news" case (click here to read the case), pointing out that under Section 1717(b)  the rules for awarding fees are not rigid, there is no precise formula, and trial courts have discretion  to weigh the claims and defenses against the actual outcome to see if either party really prevailed over the other at trial. The case,  De La Cuesta v. Benham, involved a landlord/tenant dispute over unpaid rent. The tenant defended on the grounds the property was uninhabitable due to water leaks and sewer problems. The result was the landlord was awarded only 70% of his claimed damages and therefore, the trial court ruled that he was not the prevailing party and was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ordered the case be remanded to the trial court for a hearing on the reasonableness of the attorney's fee request. 

The De La Cuesta case is not ground breaking law but it should have an eye-opening effect on lawyers and their clients. The court's factual summaries of several published  Section 1717 cases  help to unwrap the riddle of the mysterious, enigmatic prevailing party law. Trial court's do have discretion; attorney fees are not automatic, even if your victory means you did somewhat better than the other side. The  Nasser case, for example, was a "mixed result" case where a tenant got what he wanted-staying in the premises-but he also got hit with a rent increase. The trial court ruled there was no prevailing party in the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In the Kytasty case, a given "right" was validated, but its scope was curtailed. The trial court's ruling that there was no prevailing party was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In the Hilltop case, a movie promoter was required to pay monetary damages but won on the alter ego theory. Same result as the others: the "result was a draw," neither side prevailed, no attorney's fees. Several other cases are mentioned in the opinion to illustrate the nuances of the so-called good news bad news cases.

LESSONS and APPLICATIONS

  • The likelihood of absorbing your own attorney's fees or having to pay the other side's attorney's fees is a factor  that must be considered in your litigation risk analysis, and should be reflected in your expectations about the  reasonable settlement value of the case.
  • It is better to consider the potential ramifications of a good news bad news case than react to the realities of one. 
  • Clients should be informed of all the risks of trial, including the possibility that winning the case does not necessarily mean prevailing for purposes of attorney's fees awards. 

POST SCRIPT: In a recent mediation of mine, an attorney for one of the parties wanted to terminate our discussions about the attorney's fees and costs, and advised his client that it was not necessary to make any concessions with respect to the costs of litigation. He believed his client would be deemed the prevailing party even if the damage award was only $1. This post is dedicated to all lawyers who may have this belief. May your Pyrrhic victories be few and far between.

 

March Madness: Attribution Errors, Scorched Earth Litigation, and Dispute Resolution

The NCAA Basketball Tournament, known as March Madness, is upon us. Each year college basketball fans are captivated by this great sporting event, where winners advance toward the championship and losers go home. Trials are like that: eventually there is a winner and a loser in every case. Except the loser does not always go home; sometimes he appeals. In a recent case the California Court of Appeals alluded to another march (Sherman's) and another kind of madness when it used the term scorched earth litigation to describe the hard fouling, take charge lawyering in the case.

 After the trial's conclusion, the court made a number of comments indicating the case was a "disaster" and had gotten completely "out of hand." Among other things, the court referred to "scorched earth litigation" and said that attorneys for both parties were "obstructionists." (Click here to read the case*

Scorched earth litigation tactics are often the product of what social scientists and negotiation experts call "attribution errors." When a person makes a mistake, he will attribute situational factors as the reason for the problem rather than blame himself: I was careless; I was exhausted; I was ill. On the other hand, the same person who makes allowances for himself will attribute the actions of his adversary to internal factors: he is dishonest; he is a cheater; he is immoral.

I have seen attribution errors by lawyers many, many times: A claim for extras is not because of a legitimate disagreement about the contract documents, but because the contractor intentionally underbid the work and now is asserting frivolous claims. An owner rejects a claim for extras not because he really believes the work is included in the contract price but because he wants to get something for free. Of course personalities and pettiness can create conflict, and there are those who prosecute or defend claims without good cause; but most often claims can be resolved when people are willing to attribute human error as the cause of the dispute rather than human failings.

That is not to say that construction claims are always easily resolved. Construction is a risky business, and when things go wrong parties do go into self-preservation mode. However, litigation is costly enough without burning money to destroy the other side. Objective risk analysis is essential. It is not enough to convince yourself that you are right, but can you convince a judge or 12 jurors? Will they be able to comprehend your arguments, sort through the piles of evidence, and make the correct decision? Have you spent enough time listening to the other side's arguments to see if there is any common ground or how a judge or jury might react to their side of the case?

In addition to a comprehensive legal analysis of a claim and an objective view of the psychological barriers to conflict resolution, serious consideration must be given to the economic analysis of a claim. Often parties will think in terms of the likelihood of success in prosecuting or defending a claim, with only a secondary thought being given to the costs of litigation and the risks of having to pay the other side's costs and attorneys fees. This phenomenon is illustrated in the recent construction law case mentioned above.

The plaintiffs were homeowners in Newport Beach, California. They filed a lawsuit against their home improvement contractor, alleging claims for breach of contract, fraud, accounting, and violations of California Business & Professions Code section 17200, a law designed to protect competitors and consumers from illegal, fraudulent, and unfair business practices. As a result, it appears the lawsuit was framed in such a way that the dispute was not just about the work being done right or on time or within budget, but the contractor was accused of fraudulent, illegal, and unfair business practices. (Attribution errors?) The contractor filed a cross-complaint for $84,000 against the homeowners and, apparently, the lawyers began the litigation equivalent of a  "full-court press" that eventually lead to the trial court judge's condemning remarks about scorched earth litigation.

Ultimately, the jury found against the homeowners and in favor of the contractor, awarding $20,401, substantially less than the $84,000 the contractor had sought. The contractor then filed a cost memorandum seeking more than $105,000 in costs.The trial court awarded a little more than $28,000 as the reasonable costs of the litigation. This amount included an award of $3700 out of the $36,000 sought for expert witness fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, a law enacted to encourage settlements. The contractor appealed, claiming the trial court committed error by not awarding more for the costs of litigation. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order, and awarded the homeowners their costs on appeal.

Apparently attribution errors extended to the arguments before the court of appeals, as the appellate court noted:

[Contractor] somewhat histrionically insists there was a "procedural ambush" and a deliberate attempt to deprive [him] of the right to respond, rather than an error on the [Homeowner's] part.

And the scorched earth litigation continued on appeal:

After considering a 42-page opening brief, a 33-page response, a 39-page reply and a record exceeding 1200 pages on appeal from what should have been a simple motion to tax costs, one can perhaps begin to understand the trial court's reaction.

SCOREBOARD

First Half (trial court phase): Homeowners-$0; Contractor-$20,000 out of $84,000 in damages plus $28,000 out of $105,000 in costs.

Second Half (appellate phase): Contractor-$0; Homeowners- awarded costs of appeal.

We do not know how much the parties paid in attorney fees. Probably a lot. Presumably there was no attorney fee provision in the construction contract so each side had to bear their own fees.

I often wonder about cases like this. Would the contractor have come on so strong, spent so much money, and fought so hard if the lawsuit had been limited to construction issues instead of the additional allegations of fraud that impugned his reputation and character? What could have been done to avoid such an outcome? Here are a few questions worth considering the next time you are contemplating going to trial:

  • Is it possible that you misjudged the motivation of the other side?
  • Does the amount in dispute justify the expense of trial?
  • Are you willing to bear the emotional toll and the distractions that trials entail?
  • Have you thought about how a trial, win or lose,  will affect your family, partners, or shareholders?
  • When deciding to take the case through trial, did you factor in your attorneys fees and costs of litigation and the possibility of having to pay the other side's attorneys fees and costs, including their expert witness fees? 
  • Did you conduct an objective risk analysis of your chances of prevailing?
  • Will a jury understand your case?
  • If you factored in costs and fees, did you consider that the court might not award you all the costs and fees you would be asking for?
  • Did you consider the possibility of an appeal and even a retrial?
  • Did you factor in the time value of money?

Of course, some cases have to go to trial because the results of the parties' risk analyses are in different brackets (my last shot at a  March Madness reference, I promise). But in most cases, when parties objectively consider their legal and economic risk analyses, and the psychological barriers to resolving their conflict, common ground can be established and the dispute can be amicably resolved prior to trial.

 *The Court of Appeal designated the featured case as one not suited for publication in the Official Reports which means it can not be cited or relied upon by courts or parties.

The Social Network: Communications During Mediation Are Not In The Public Domain

The California Supreme Court has reaffirmed confidentiality as a core principle in the mediation of disputes in California. The plaintiff in  Cassell v. Superior Court sued his former lawyers, Wasserman Comden, for legal malpractice arising from a mediated settlement, and he wanted to use information from the mediation session to prove his case. (More about that case later.) A more high profile case has the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals currently wrestling with mediation confidentiality in the Facebook litigation where the Winklevoss twins have appealed to the 9th Circuit Court to get out of a settlement that reportedly gave them $20 million in cash plus 1.25 million shares of Facebook stock (estimated to be currently worth $150 million). An interesting side note is the Winklevoss twins also had a dispute with their lawyers, Quinn Emanuel, arising out the mediation that lead to that settlement with Facebook, the settlement they are now trying to get out of. (Click here to read the Supreme Court of New York's opinion about the $13 million dollar attorney fee dispute.)

Public policy favors the pre-trial settlement of disputes, and mediation is considered by many to be  the most effective alternative dispute resolution procedure. To encourage parties to openly discuss their disputes without fear of having their communications turned on them at trial,  the California legislature enacted confidentiality laws to keep mediation information private. When people try to get out of a settlement agreement by claiming  fraud, economic duress, or some other legal theory to rescind a contract, and they attempt to use confidential information from a mediation, the courts are reluctant to consider such information. For example, during oral argument in the Winklevoss' appeal to the 9th Circuit, the judges expressed concern about  letting them use information obtained in their mediation with Facebook. Check out this YouTube video of the oral arguments by two exceptional attorneys before three outstanding jurists.  

 

Unlike the the Facebook litigation where one party is attempting to use confidential mediation information against the other party to the lawsuit, the new California Supreme Court case of Cassell v. Superior Court presents a situation where the client is suing his lawyer for malpractice based upon the words and conduct of his lawyer during the mediation. In essence, the client argued that the lawyer used undue influence, pressure, and fraud to induce him to settle the lawsuit for an amount that was less than they had agreed upon in their planning meeting before the mediation.

Prior to the trial of the malpractice lawsuit, the defendant lawyers asked the court to exclude any evidence of their words and actions related to the mediation based on the confidentiality laws. The trial court agreed that such communications were confidential, even in malpractice actions filed by clients against their lawyers. The client appealed the case and the Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that the confidentiality provisions of the Evidence Code applied to disputes between parties to a lawsuit but such protections should not be extended to disputes between clients and their lawyers. The California Supreme Court disagreed, saying that the applicable statutes mean what they say: all communications related to a mediation are confidential. 

Instead, such attorney-client communications, like other communications, were confidential, and therefore were neither discoverable nor admissible-even for proving a claim of legal malpractice-insofar as they were "for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to a mediation...."

Lessons Learned and Some Practical Applications

  • Mediations really are confidential.
  • Mediations are not mandatory; they can end at any time or be continued to another date. If you are too tired to proceed, take a break. One of the complaints of the plaintiff in the Cassell case was that the settlement happened after 14 hours of mediation; he was tired and felt pressure from his lawyers to settle the case.
  • Mediations, like trials, can terminate a lawsuit; therefore preparation is essential, and it is the key to success in mediation. Lawyers must be prepared to clearly present the law and facts of the case; just as importantly, they must ready their clients for the mediation experience.
  • It is good to set a settlement value before the mediation but you should remain flexible during mediation in case you learn something new or gain a different perspective during mediation. The plaintiff in the Cassell case based his malpractice action in part on the fact that the case settled for less than he and his lawyers had agreed upon before the mediation. That is not unusual. A good mediator can help parties see cases from a fresh perspective which may alter the reasonable settlement value of the case. Better to get that perspective from a mediator than from a juror in an interview after an expensive trial that may bring you less than you expected.
  • The Winklevoss twins argued that the term sheet that memorialized the settlement deal did not contain the essential elements of an enforceable contract. If you had a chance to look at the YouTube video of the oral argument before the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal, you saw Chief Judge Kozinski and the Winklevoss' lawyer debating the sufficiency of the term sheet as an enforceable settlement contract. Judge Kozinski noted that the term sheet included the number of shares, the amount of cash-"everything you would want in a contract." Nevertheless, in the lessons learned category, it is important to remember that a settlement agreement is a contract and must meet the minimum requirements to be enforceable.

One final note, a humorous one( to me, anyway),  from the oral argument in the Facebook litigation. Senior Judge J. Clifford Wallace asked how the brilliant, Harvard-educated Winklevoss twins, who were being advised by high-powered lawyers and their father who is a business expert, could have been tricked into settling their lawsuit.

"Isn't it a little difficult to say...that they were taken advantage of?" Judge Wallace asked them.

The Winkevoss' lawyer responded that it was true his clients " were not behind the barn door when brains were passed out." But, he said, "The same is true with Facebook."

 

 

 

 

New California Supreme Court Case re Arbitration and Court-Appointed Referees

Alternative dispute resolution procedures such as arbitration, mediation, and references to referees are often found in commercial contracts. A recurring issue in the ADR world is the enforceabilty of an arbitration provision when one side claims it is  unconscionable. A companion issue in California is the enforceabilty of provisions that require parties to submit their disputes to a court-appointed referee pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 638 in the event the arbitration provision is found to be unenforceable.

In cases involving large groups such as tenants or members of home owner associations, a threshold issue is often whether some members of a group can be compelled to submit to the appointment of a referee when other members of the group do not have predispute reference provisions in their contracts for one reason or another. This was the situation in an opinion published last week by the California Supreme Court in a case called Tarrant Bell Property v. The Superior Court of California. 

Here's What Happened

 A couple of years ago, 120 lessees and residents of a mobile home park sued the owners of the park for failing to maintain the common areas and facilities and for otherwise subjecting the residents to substandard living conditions. The standard lease agreement provided that any landlord-tenant disputes would be resolved through arbitration but if the arbitration clause was deemed unenforceable the parties would submit their dispute to a court-appointed referee. However, the arbitration and reference provisions were found in only 100 of the 120 leases at issue.

In response to the lawsuit, the park owners filed a motion to compel arbitration, or, in the alternative, for an appointment of a referee. The tenants opposed the motion, arguing the arbitration and reference provisions were unenforceable and that, because some of the leases did not include the arbitration and  reference provisions, the motion should be denied to avoid the risk of conflicting rulings on common issues of law and fact.

The trial court denied the park owners' motion to compel arbitration on the grounds the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. The court also declined to enforce the predispute reference provision because of the possibility that the tenants could face inconsistent results even though they were experiencing the same problems at the mobile home park. In other words, the tenants with leases containing the reference provision would have there disputes reviewed by a referee in one proceeding while the other tenants who were not bound by the predispute provision would have their disputes resolved in court by a judge. This presents a question of fairness as the judge might not rule the same way as the referee on common questions of law and fact. Same problem; potentially different results. Unfair.

The park owners petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate seeking to vacate the trial court's order denying their motion to appoint a referee. The Court of Appeal denied the writ, finding the trial court had the discretion to refuse to enforce the reference provision because of the possibility of conflicting rulings and other issues related to the efficient resolution of disputes.

The park owners appealed to the California Supreme Court. The Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding the legislative history of Code of Civil Procedure 638 establishes an intent to give trial courts the discretion to deny a request for the appointment of a referee when the potential for inconsistent findings is present. The Court also noted its disapproval of two appellate decisions to the contrary.

 Lessons Learned

 Some ADR provisions in commercial contracts are written with a belts and suspenders approach. Such contracts have arbitration as the first option for dispute resolution. If a court later finds that the arbitration provision is unenforceable, an alternative provision requires that the dispute be submitted to a court-appointed referee. 

Despite the careful drafting of such ADR provisions, disputes, like a baggy pair of pants, can fall to the ground when the most obvious details-like buckling and fastening-are not  considered. In California, you had better be sure the ADR provisions you spent so much time, effort and money preparing are actually found in the signed contracts of your opposition, especially when you are dealing with large groups of people such as tenants and home owner associations.

 

 

A New Construction Defect Case To Sink Your Teeth Into

For a long time construction defects and California law seemed to go together like peanut butter and jelly. It got a little sticky, however, for trial courts trying to deal with large, complex, multi-party cases, and builders who faced sizable jury verdicts. After many years of prolific construction defect cases, numerous vanguard appellate decisions,  and some intense lobbying by the construction industry, the California legislature enacted SB 800 in 2002. The law requires home owners to give notice and an opportunity to repair construction defects to builders prior to filing a lawsuit. However, the law, now codified in California Civil Code sections 895 through 945.5, gives builders the option of implementing their own contractual pre-litigation procedures for notice and repair of construction defects. The intent is to give builders an opportunity to repair construction defects before lawsuits are filed. If all goes well, contentious, expensive litigation can be avoided altogether.

Previously I posted an article and referred to a then new case that answered the question of whether the pre-litigation procedures under SB 800 amounted to a claim for purposes of triggering an insurance company's duty to defend ( See A Case of First Impression: Duty to Defend Construction Defect Claims in Pre-litigation Proceedings, July 28, 2010). This post addresses another aspect of the law: what happens if the builder elects to implement its own pre-litigation procedures into the purchase contract, and those procedures are found to be legally unenforceable? Can the builder then compel the buyer to follow the statutory pre-litigation procedures before filing a lawsuit?  In another case of first impression regarding the interpretation of SB 800, the California 5th District Court of Appeal said no. 

In Anders  v. Superior Court (Meritage Homes of California), home owners filed a construction defect lawsuit against Meritage Homes of California. Some of the home owners purchased their homes directly from Meritage and some of them purchased their homes from the original owners who had purchased their homes from Meritage. The original purchase contracts contained the builder's version of a pre-litigation notice and opportunity to repair procedure. In response to the lawsuit Meritage filed a motion to compel the home owners to follow the contractual pre-litigation procedures. The home owners opposed the motion. The trial court ruled that the alternative contractual procedures were unconscionable and unenforceable but also ruled that the homeowners would have to comply with the SB 800 requirements before proceeding with the lawsuit, and issued an order staying the litigation pending completion of the statutory pre-litigation procedures.

The home owners then filed a writ of mandate with the court of appeal to overturn that portion of the trial court's order requiring them to comply with the statutory procedures. The home owners argued that SB 800 provides that, if the builder's alternative procedures are found to be unenforceable, the builder may not enforce the statutory pre-litigation procedures and home owners are free to file a lawsuit without compliance with those procedures. The court of appeal agreed and issued a writ directing the trial court to vacate that portion of its order that required the home owners to comply with the statutory pre-litigation procedures. This meant the stay of the lawsuit would be lifted and the home owners could proceed with their lawsuit.

Practical Applications Of The Case

  • Builders may be more likely to choose the statutory pre-litigation procedures rather than attempt to draft procedures that can withstand judicial scrutiny; and
  • In the event the purchase contract does contain contractual pre-litigation procedures of the builder's making, home owners may be more willing to ignore them, file a lawsuit, and argue that the contractual procedures are unconscionable and unenforceable. 

Final thoughts: As long as people try to build homes, there will be construction defects. Which means there will always be construction defect litigation. Given this fact, it is important to try to find fair and efficient ways to resolve them. SB 800 was supposed to be the answer but in my work as a mediator, I have found that the pre-litigation procedures are effective only to the extent there is some element of good will and mutual respect among the parties and for the process. The Anders case illustrates what can happen when one side seeks to impose an unfair advantage over the other side. While contracts serve the important purpose of clearly establishing the terms and conditions of the deal, when you try to leverage your position by imposing  burdensome conditions on the other party, it can put you in a real jam.

Enforcing Settlement Agreements With the Wisdom of Benjamin Franklin

Benjamin Franklin, born 305 years ago this month, famously said, "A place for everything, everything in its place."  This is true for many things, including settlement agreements which are really just contracts for the resolution of disputes. However, like all contracts, settlement agreements have a place for certain things and certain things, such as provisions which identify the consideration being given, the scope of the release and waiver of rights, and much more, must be in their place. Most states have enacted laws that encourage the settlement of civil disputes and attempt to prevent them from being broken. Today's featured case is an example of the underlying public policy that favors the settlement of disputes.

In Blix Street Records v. Cassidy , the plaintiff tried to get out of a settlement agreement, initially lost at the trial court level, then won on appeal, but lost again at trial and ultimately on a second appeal.  Plaintiff's actions were emblematic of another Ben Franklin saying, "Necessity never made a good bargain."

Eva Cassidy was a popular singer and song writer who died in 1996. A dispute arose over royalty payments and motion picture rights associated with Ms. Cassidy's career. A trial began with the empaneling of a jury. During an extended break in the trial, the parties engaged in a mediation which resulted in a settlement. The handwritten settlement agreement contained a release and specified it was subject to judicial enforcement. The parties also agreed that they would prepare a formal settlement agreement after the mediation.

The parties sent an e-mail notification of the settlement to the judge. Later, however, the plaintiff owner of Blix Street Records, an attorney, began to have concerns about the settlement agreement. He believed it was one-sided in favor of the Cassidys, that material terms were missing, and that some of the existing terms were ambiguous. These concerns were not expressed to the other side nor to the court. As a result, the trial court, based on the representations of the parties that the case had been settled, dismissed the jury.

Subsequently, Blix Street Records hired another attorney who informed the Cassidys that the settlement agreement was neither binding nor enforceable. The Cassidys then successfully moved the trial court for an entry of judgment based on the settlement agreement. On appeal, the court held the settlement agreement was not enforceable because it lacked the necessary signatures of certain parties, and the case was remanded to the trial court. The Cassidys then amended their cross-complaint to add a breach of settlement contract cause of action, and the trial court ruled that even though the settlement agreement was not enforceable per the court of appeal's decision, Blix Street Records was judicially estopped from denying the enforceability of the settlement agreement because the court discharged the jury based on the representations of the parties, including Blix Street Records, that the case had been settled. Judgment was entered in favor of the defendants, and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the ruling of the trial court, the court of appeal stated:

Based on the facts, the trial court had sufficient evidence to conclude that Blix Street took two totally inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings—originally that there was an enforceable settlement agreement, but later that the settlement agreement was not enforceable. Blix Street was successful in asserting the first position because the trial court accepted Blix Streetā€Ÿs position by terminating the trial and discharging the jury.There is no indication that Blix Street took the first position—that the contract was enforceable—as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake. Indeed, Straw, a lawyer, conceded that he believed the settlement agreement lacked material terms at the same time Blix Street was taking the position in the trial court there was an enforceable settlement agreement. Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial estoppel legally could be applied in this case.

 There is some Franklinesqe wisdom that can be taken from this case:

  1. Undoing a settlement can put you in a worse position than the actual terms of the settlement. Here, Blix Street Records is subject to the terms of the release but some of the other parties are not. Addressing this anomoly, the court said: "Estoppel-whether judicial, equitable, or promissory-can, however, be used to bind a party to what would otherwise be an unenforceable contract."
  2. If you have doubts, shout them out. Blix Street Records had misgivings about the settlement before the trial court dismissed the jury. This would be a different case had those concerns been expressed to the court earlier.
  3. An ounce of preparation is better than a pound of cure, or something like that. Take a laptop to the mediation that is loaded with your standard form settlement agreement. That way you don't have to waste time and effort ensuring that your standard provisions are in place which will give you more time to thoughtfully draft any complicated provisions. 
  4. If you can't dot every "i" be sure to cross every "t". In California, there is more than one way to enforce a settlement. If you can not get everyone's signature on the agreement, ask the judge to order everyone to court so the agreement can be put on the record. A settlement agreement is enforceable if it is in a writing signed by the parties or if the parties so stipulate before the court. (CCP 664.6)
  5. Settlement agreements containing executory provisions benefit from 800 pound gorilla  riders. Under 664.6, if requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.

I'll end with one more quote from Ben: "A slip of the foot you may soon recover, but the slip of the tongue you may never get over." 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Recent (Painful) Lessons from the California Court of Appeal

Appellate court opinions provide more than intrinsic precedential value; they are also useful reads in a “best practices” kind of way. Sometimes the lesson derived from them is “what not to do,” as illustrated in two recent cases from the California Court of Appeals.

The first case is one of those “I did not expect that to happen” kinds of cases. In S.J. Amoroso Construction v. Knecht (click here to read the unpublished opinion), the prime contractor took a default judgment in excess of $200,000 against its window subcontractor which was a corporate entity. After taking the debtor examination of the sole shareholder, the prime contractor sued the owner individually, seeking to pierce the corporate veil or amend the judgment to add the owner. The trial court refused to pierce the corporate veil, found the tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and, to add insult to injury, awarded the defendant $70,000 in attorney fees, and the California Court of Appeals affirmed. As a result, after the contractor incurred untold attorney fees and costs, a $200,000 uncollectible default judgment turned into a $70,000 obligation that the plaintiff contractor must pay to the defendant owner.

It appears from the case that the contractor had not anticipated the risk of having to pay the owner’s attorney fees if things did not turn out as planned. The contractor reasoned that since the contract was between two corporations (which meant that the owner was not a party to the contract in his individual capacity) the owner could not be awarded attorney fees based on that contract. The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting that California Civil Code section 1717 makes the right to an award of attorney fees a reciprocal benefit to the prevailing party “whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not…”

Attorney fees were also an issue in another one of those “I’ve got a sick feeling” cases. In Silver v. Pacific American Fish Company (click here to read opinion), a cross complaint arising from a purchase agreement and related employment contract was filed. The cross-defendant responded by asserting lack of standing and judicial estoppel based on the cross-complainant’s prior bankruptcy proceeding. The trial court ruled in the cross-defendant’s favor, and an appeal was filed from the adverse judgment. The court of appeal rejected the grounds for appeal on various substantive and procedural points. This portion of the opinion is required reading because it reinforces the caution trial attorneys must take in prosecuting cases while preserving issues for appeal.

In the published portion of the opinion, the court held the cross-complainant’s notice of appeal from the post judgment order awarding the cross-defendant attorney fees was untimely, and that his notice of appeal from the judgment did not encompass the separately appealable post judgment order awarding attorney fees. Therefore, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction over the challenge to the order awarding attorney fees. The court of appeal explained:

The notice was filed after Pacific had filed its attorney fees motion, but well before any hearing or ruling on that motion. Thus, at the time Silver purported to appeal the order on Pacific’s motion, there had been no indication of the trial court’s intended ruling on that motion. The trial court’s oral pronouncement of a ruling did not occur until March

26, 2009, over a month after the filing of Silver’s notice of appeal. A notice of appeal filed after rendition of a judgment or statement of intended ruling but before entry of judgment may be treated as timely...But here, Silver filed his notice of appeal before the statement of intended decision. Thus, the notice as it relates to the trial court’s subsequent ruling on Pacific’s attorney fees motion is untimely under the holding in First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 960 [notice of appeal filed before announcement of trial court’sintended ruling is untimely and cannot be treated as a premature but timely notice].

These cases caught my eye, not because the opinions were so profound or far-reaching but because they illustrate the precarious, unpredictable path of litigation. Successful lawyers understand these challenges and have the wisdom and experience to know which cases should be settled, which cases must be tried, and which cases should not be filed at all. Lawyers with these kinds of skills are more than great litigators; they are also trusted counselors at law. 

Resolving Construction Defect Cases: Are Arbitration Provisions in CC&R's Enforceable?

In construction defect cases there is often a dispute within the dispute: should the case be prosecuted in a court of law or proceed under the terms and conditions of an arbitration provision? There are rational reasons for selecting arbitration over a court or jury trial. Many believe that arbitrations are more cost effective than jury trials, for example. However, parties who arbitrate their disputes give up the constitutional right to a jury trial and their appellate rights are generally restricted, among other things.

Real estate developers often prefer arbitration over jury trials for various reasons, not the least of which is the belief that they would fair better in front of an experienced construction law arbitrator than they would in front of 12 jurors who probably have little or no understanding of the construction industry. As a result, developers will often include arbitration provisions in documents called conditions, covenants, and restrictions (referred to as CC&R's) which are akin to by-laws for corporations. CC&R's constitute the governing document for members of homeowner associations and tell  property owners what they can and cannot do within the development.

In California, the law on the issue of whether or not an arbitration provision in CC&R's is enforceable is unsettled. Yesterday, the California Supreme Court granted review in the Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US) LLC case. Attorney Kathleen Carpenter of Luce Forward has provided a good summary of the relevant cases and issues which you can read by clicking here. You can read the Pinnacle case and two other cases, the Villa Vicenza case which is pending in the Fourth Appellate District, where the Court granted rehearing after holding that such provisions in CC&R's are not enforceable, and the Villa Moreno HOA case, the first California case to address the issue (in 2000) by clicking here, here, and here.

If you have a case involving the issue of the enforceability of an arbitration provision in CC&R's, you may have to wait awhile to get a definitive answer to that question. As Ms. Carpenter notes in her summary, it may take 12 -24 months before the California Supreme Court issues its opinion in the Pinnacle Museum Tower case, and the Fourth Appellate District's opinion in the Villa Vicenza case is not expected until January 2011. Meanwhile, she notes, it is likely the Supreme Court will grant review and stay other similar cases until it decides Pinnacle Museum Tower.

A Scorched Earth Litigation Strategy Can Leave You With A Bitter Pill To Swallow

The Critical Path recently reported on a study showing lawyer overconfidence as a barrier to the efficient resolution of disputes. This post will focus on a different study and a recent case that illustrate another barrier to conflict resolution: parties who view disputes as warfare and litigation as a battlefield.

Researchers have found that men in war simulations often overestimated their chances of winning, making them more likely to attack and behave aggressively, resulting in unnecessary losses that could have been prevented with a more balanced approach. In a recent "unpublished " opinion of the California Court of Appeal, a case in which the defendants engaged in "scorched earth tactics," according to the court,  overly aggressive conduct resulted in unnecessary losses for the defense. Click here to read the case. (Note: California Rules of Court prohibit courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication, except as specified by rule 8.1115.) 

The plaintiff in the case was a flight attendant on a corporate jet. She was fired and sued her former employer, two corporate officers, and the pilot. At one point in the litigation, the case could have settled for between $200,000 and $400,000. One of the defendants told his lawyers that he was not interested in settling the case, but rather in destroying the former employee and her lawyer at whatever the cost. As a result, his lawyers engaged in an aggressive litigation strategy described by the court as follows:

The ensuing pace and vitriol of this litigation is suggested by the circumstance that no less than five summary judgment motions were filed, two of them by Medvig. Unsurprisingly, the discovery process was reduced to warfare that was as intense as it was costly.

Costly indeed. With bills of $150,000 to $200,000 per month, the inevitable happened. First, the case did settle, with the defendants paying the former employee not $200,000 or even $400,000, but rather $675,000. And a second dispute erupted between defendants and their lawyers over legal fees, so the law firm withdrew from the case and sued for more than $1,000,000, having only been paid $200,000 for the work of its lawyers. An arbitrator awarded the law firm $938,457 for the unpaid fees, $327,000 for attorney fees incurred to collect the fees, costs of $152,105, plus 10% interest.

The law firm then filed a petition with the trial court to confirm the arbitration award against the defendants. Ultimately, the trial court entered judgment for $1,551,215. The defendants appealed, lost, and the court of appeal awarded costs of appeal to the law firm for an unspecified amount. 

Moral of the Story

To paraphrase a 1970's catchphrase, "Stuff happens." So do disputes. They happen in life, and in business. How we respond to them is our choice. Is there an alternative to the "destroy the opposition at whatever cost" approach to litigation? Of course there is. One of my favorite Japanese proverbs describes an approach that is both economical and wise: "Even a piece of paper has two sides". 

You can spend a lot of money hammering the opposition with discovery to beat them into submission or use it as a precise instrument to figure out what's on the other side of your own story. This will enable you to evaluate the case, analyze the risk of going to trial, and engage in meaningful settlement negotiations. In addition to a factual inquiry, you may want to consider the emotional elements that may be driving the litigation. For example:

    • What are the conditions and circumstances of the other side?
    • What is the financial condition of the other side?
    • What business or personal pressures is the other side facing?
    • What would my interests be if I were on the other side?

When we try to see things from the other side's perspective, we can more clearly focus on the strengths and weaknesses of our side of the story. Anger is replaced by wisdom. Fewer mistakes are made. Economical resolutions are reached. On the other hand, when the focus is on destroying an opponent, our judgment becomes slanted; we look at the dispute solely through the narrow lens of our own experiences filtered by our own prejudices.

In the case cited above, decisions based on anger and retribution thwarted a $400,000 settlement and left the defendants with a bitter 1.8 million dollar pill to swallow. I hope their experience is good medicine for us all.

 

 

 

Construction Claims and Catch 22: Spoliation vs. Remediation

It is one thing to assert construction claims; it is another thing to prove your case with admissible evidence. Therefore, those who intend to litigate construction claims must keep Steven Covey's advice in mind: Begin with the end in mind. This mindfulness must begin prior to the commencement of the project. Systems must be put in place to manage, sort, and preserve potential evidence. If you wait until a lawsuit is filed to get your ducks in order, it may be too late. At that point, the more appropriate aphorism has something to do with cats, not ducks, because organizing admissible evidence at that juncture is like herding cats. With enough time and money, you may get most of what you want organized and ready for trial, but something is bound to get away from you-or taken away from you by the court.

The reality of being precluded from using evidence at the trial of a construction defect case was aptly demonstrated in a recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Tri-Form Construction case (August 2010). To read the entire opinion click here. This case is a useful primer on a number of levels. First, it deals with the issue of spoliation, meaning, the destruction of evidence. What happens when evidence is destroyed in the remediation process so that the defendant no longer has the evidence to defend itself in court? The New Jersey Supreme Court also does a good job summarizing the competing interests and corresponding difficulties of parties involved in construction litigation.

How Courts Perceive Construction Claims

Commercial construction projects often present unique challenges to the courts, in part because when an argument erupts over a claimed construction defect, it is inevitably complicated by the conflicting interests of the parties. The project owner wants the building to be free of defects, while other parties to the project, including the general contractor, its subcontractors and suppliers, the construction manager, if any, the architect and other design professionals, each may dispute the existence of, the extent of, and the responsibility for, any claimed defects. Moreover, each of them may seek to shift the blame for any conceded defect to others and each will likely assert that it has the right to investigate the claim and to attempt to cure any defects that are identified.

Further compounding those competing interests, time itself may create overriding considerations for the building's owner. Particularly if the claimed defect threatens the building's integrity or the owner's ability to conduct its business, the owner will view the time within which to remedy a defect in a building's construction as being constrained. The building's owner, fearing that existing, identified defects, if not cured promptly, will worsen or adversely affect other parts of the structure, may have limited patience with a contractor who does not resolve a problem quickly. The owner may lose confidence in the contractor's ability to remedy a defect if that contractor's response is slow or if proposed resolutions are inadequate. In either situation, the building owner may hasten to seek solutions from experts, consultants, or contractors in an effort to prevent a relatively minor problem from turning into a major failure of one of the building's systems.

Nor is the building's owner the only party whose interests complicate the dispute. A contractor who is being blamed for a problem may conclude that there is no defect to be cured and, if the complaints persist, may come to regard the owner as unreasonable or as seeking perfection when the work was performed in an adequate, acceptable, and workmanlike manner. Alternatively, the contractor may recognize that there is a defect and try to resolve it, or it may decide that the problem was caused by a supplier, laborer, or another contractor outside of its control, or has resulted from faulty plans or specifications.

Other parties to a large construction project will also have their own unique perspectives on the owner's claim that there is a problem to be addressed. General contractors, construction managers, architects, and engineers each have a role to play in the project and interests to protect in the event that a claimed defect is identified. Questions about whether the defect arose because of faulty plans and specifications, improper design, poor workmanship, defective materials, insufficiently skilled subcontractors, or inadequate supervision may divide the participants and confound the ability to reach a workable solution.

As complicated as the relationships inherently are, they are compounded when they play out in the shadow of threatened or actual litigation. The reality of how project owners, contractors, and related professionals behave, each with distinct and often inconsistent goals and motivations, frequently leads one or more of them to act in ways that impact on the eventual conduct of that litigation.

The building owner who only wants to solve a problem and prevent it from getting worse may undertake testing and repairs without waiting for a resolution by the contractor whose work the owner believes is the cause. The contractor called back to the building for a repair may make suggestions or corrections without undertaking a thorough investigation or fully documenting the alleged defect or identifying other potential causes. Even if the parties act with the purest motives, evidence of the extent or the cause of any claimed defect may be compromised or destroyed as testing and investigations are undertaken and as repair, retrofitting, or replacement of affected building systems or components is completed.

It is preferable, of course, to have an orderly procedure for identifying a defect, alerting the allegedly culpable party, conducting an investigation and testing that is observed and documented by representatives for all potentially responsible parties, identifying a cause, and achieving a solution. In the real world of construction projects, however, the parties do not always behave that way and may proceed to develop a solution without preserving all of the evidence that is needed to determine liability or prove damages.

Owner's Catch 22: Remediation vs. Spoliation

Catch 22 has come to be known as a situation in which a desired outcome is impossible to achieve because of a set of illogical rules or conditions. As will be shown, the owner in the Tri-Com Construction case was in a Catch 22 situation. The curtain wall system in the owner's large new commercial building leaked, and the subcontractor that installed it eventually stopped responding to the owner's request for help. What is an owner to do? On the one hand, he must take action to protect his building and the health and safety of those who work there. On the other hand, if litigation is contemplated, remediation could destroy evidence that may be necessary to prosecute or defend the claims.

In this case, after the owner fixed the problems with the window system, the company sued its construction manager, its consultant Tri-Form Construction, and the installation subcontractor, Academy Glass. The defendants filed motions to exclude all evidence regarding the curtain wall system on the grounds of spoliation of evidence. The New Jersey Supreme Court summarized the proceedings as follows:

On March 21 and 22, 2006, the trial court separately granted defendants' motions to exclude evidence relating to the window system installation. In reaching that conclusion, the court found that plaintiff had never given notice to defendants about the proposed remediation prior to the commencement of the work; had failed to respond to defendants' initial requests to conduct an inspection; had first notified defendants of the remediation work on January 24, 2003, when there was insufficient time to permit them to perform an independent investigation; and had completed the repairs when there was no real emergency.

The trial court concluded that plaintiff had engaged in spoliation of the evidence and that there was clear prejudice to defendants because their expert had not been given an opportunity to fully investigate the leaks and their cause. The court also concluded that the expert's photographs and his records about his visual observations were not sufficient[ to permit defendants to secure an expert opinion contrary to that offered on plaintiff's behalf.

Shortly thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment to one defendant and partial summary judgment to another on the grounds plaintiff owner could not no longer prove its claims following the order excluding evidence. The plaintiff owner appealed and the appellate division reversed the order of dismissal, holding that the preclusion of evidence was unreasonably harsh under the circumstances. The defendants then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, and that court held:

 

In this dispute, plaintiff has already lost claims as a result of the spoliation and its claim relating to the strip-window system has been limited significantly. There remains, however, one further step in our analysis, because defendants are not similarly situated. As to defendant Academy Glass, we agree with the Appellate Division that there is a sufficient basis on which to permit plaintiff to proceed, limiting its claims to the conditions that were observable prior to remediation and its experts to a review of only those conditions.

However, we reach a different result as to defendants Tri-Form and Karabinchak. In spite of the fact that the wealth of evidence ordinarily generated during construction projects lends itself to leveling the playing field, in this case the opportunity to inspect the leaking windows before remediation was critical. Because plaintiff deprived defendants Tri-Form and Karabinchak of that opportunity, and because we therefore perceive them to have no independent source of evidence or testimony sufficient to permit them to mount a defense, the claims as to those defendants cannot proceed at all. As to defendants Tri-Form and Karabinchak, the only fair remedy for plaintiff's spoliation is to impose the sanction of dismissal.

The Tri-Form Construction case shows the rationale of courts trying to fashion a just remedy when evidence has been destroyed. Each state will have different factors to consider. In New Jersey, the courts consider the following factors:

In summary, courts confronted with spoliation in the context of commercial construction litigation should recognize that a variety of factors bear on the appropriate remedy. In particular, courts should consider all of the following: the identity of the spoliator; the manner in which the spoliation occurred, including the reason for and timing of its occurrence; the prejudice to the non-spoliating party, including whether the non-spoliating party bears any responsibility for the loss of the spoliated evidence; and the alternate sources of information that are, or are likely to be, available to the non-spoliator from its own records and personnel, from contemporaneous documentation or recordings made by or on behalf of the spoliator, and from others as a result of the usual and customary business practices in the construction industry. Courts should then balance all of those considerations in crafting the appropriate remedy with an appreciation for the ways in which the construction industry itself provides them with unique tools with which to "level the playing field" and achieve an appropriate remedy for spoliation.

Suggestions

Owners are faced with this kind of Catch 22 situation ail of the time. Here are a few suggestions to prepare for the next time it happens:

  1. Draft contract language that addresses this issue. State the address where notices can be sent to advise the other side of defective conditions. Include reasonable time frames within which  inspections and repairs are to be performed.
  2. Before taking corrective measures, advise the other side in writing of the date, time and place of the remediation efforts, giving the other side ample time and warning about the remediation efforts that are to take place, and invite them to be there to observe, take pictures, take notes, etc.
  3. Make sure to establish an unassailable record of your efforts to get the contractors to (1) take corrective action, (2) the contractors refusal to do so, and (3) that the contractors had actual notice of the time and place of your remediation efforts.
  4. During the remediation process take pictures and video of the work; handle with care any portion of the work that is removed; take special efforts to preserve the materials; keep a log of the chain of custody in case someone alleges that the materials have been tampered with.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this article, the success of the prosecution or defense of construction claims begins before the project begins: contract language, systems and controls to preserve evidence, diligence in ensuring the other side is on notice of plans for remediation, and so much more, all have a role in being prepared for potential litigation. The Tri Form Construction case is a perfect example of the uncertainty of litigation, that evidence matters, that courts have tremendous power and influence over what the jury will ultimately hear and see during trial

 

Don't Sit on Your Arbitration Rights: Assert Them or Risk Losing Them

The right to arbitrate a dispute can be waived. One way to waive arbitration rights is to sit on them, figuratively speaking, of course. By sit on them, I mean delay enforcement of the right or take steps that leads the other side to believe you do not intend to arbitrate the dispute. In a recent unpublished opinion (meaning, the case can't be cited in legal pleadings or used in oral argument as persuasive authority), the California Court of Appeal addressed the waiver issue. The case is important to the The Critical Path because the facts present a common set of circumstances that can result in a waiver. Therefore, even though the opinion is unpublished, it is instructive, and it is helpful in that it refers to most of the published California opinions on the subject. Click here to read the opinion.

Here's What Happened

Thompson Building Materials was a defendant in a construction defect case. The homeowners alleged the stone pavers provided by Thompson cracked and deteriorated due to latent defects, and that debris from the defective material damaged the pool filter and pump system. Thompson filed an answer to the complaint and participated in court-ordered proceedings, discovery, and a mediation. A week before the discovery cut-off and a month before trial, Thompson filed a motion to compel arbitration, claiming that it had recently discovered an arbitration provision on the back of the invoices for the sale of the building materials.Apparently, when the invoices were copied, only the front side was copied, leaving the backside boilerplate, including the arbitration provision, uncopied.

In support of the motion to compel arbitration, Thompson's counsel informed the trial court that

although he had-known of these invoices and had been-litigating these invoices for probably 20 years, his associate (to whom he had delegated the responsibility of responding to plaintiffs discovery) had not, and-she simply didn't know any better in terms of knowing there should have been a back side on [the invoice]. 

 Plaintiff homeowners opposed the motion to compel, arguing Thompson waived the arbitration provision by participating in the litigation for over a year and that plaintiffs were prejudiced by the fact that Thompson was attempting to compel arbitration of a case that was only a month away from trial. Plaintiffs also argued that they were prejudiced because Thompson obtained information in discovery that it would not have been able to obtain in arbitration.

 The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, and the homeowners filed a petition for writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal held the trial court's order was not supported by substantial evidence and granted the homeowners' petition. The court concluded Thompson had waived its arbitration rights:

 

Although there is no uniform test for determining whether a party‘s conduct amounts to a waiver of the right to arbitrate, the courts have formulated a list of factors that are relevant in making that determination. These include ‗―(1) whether the party‘s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‗the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked‘ and the parties ‗were well into preparation of a lawsuit‘ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay; (4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without asking for a stay of the proceedings; (5) ‗whether important intervening steps [e.g., taking advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration] had taken place‘; and (6) whether the delay ‗affected, misled, or prejudiced‘ the opposing party.(St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1196, quoting Sobremonte v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 980, 992.)

Thompson‘s conduct in this case satisfies virtually all of these factors and compels a finding of waiver. Thompson did not raise arbitration as an affirmative defense in its answer. (SeeGuess?, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at pp. 557-558.) Thompson participated in the litigation for nearly a year. In opposition to Thompson‘s motion, plaintiffs‘ counsel submitted a declaration in which he listed 54 items plaintiffs considered to be ―significant litigation activities by the parties. Nearly half of these items are discovery propounded by Thompson. The parties designated expert witnesses; Thompson‘s expert inspected plaintiffs‘ property in June 2009 and March 2010. The parties also participated in a case management conference in September 2009 and court ordered mediation in February 2010. Suffice it to say, ―the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the parties ―were well into preparation of a lawsuit before Thompson notified plaintiffs that it would seek to compel arbitration.  

 

Lessons to be Learned

Usually, the decision to include an arbitration provision in a contract is the result of a deliberative decision making process. Therefore, when a claim arises, it would be wise to take steps to preserve that right, or at least, consider your options. You may want to create a checklist that could include one or more of the following points:                                                                                                                                                

  • make sure there is  a written contract
  • assume the contract has a dispute or claims clause and check to see if there is an arbitration provision
  • decide if the arbitration provision should be enforced or waived, if it is believed that litigation would be more advantageous under the circumstances of the claim
  • decide if there are mechanics lien rights, statute of limitations issues, or other equitable remedies that must be preserved by filing a lawsuit, then seek a stay of the action, and proceed with the parts of the claim that are subject to arbitration.                                                                                                                                                      

You might also want to be sure that both sides of documents are copied before providing them to your attorney or to the other side. You would be surprised how many times issues seem to disappear simply because both sides of documents are inadvertently not copied.

 

 

 

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Draft Settlement Agreements with Care or You May Give Up More than You Bargained For

 

The first sentence in an appellate opinion can strike fear in the heart of any advocate. I should know. Nearly twenty years ago the California Court of Appeal began its opinion on a losing appeal of mine with this sentence: “This case presents a real doozy of a puzzle in mechanic's lien law.” Last week, in a case involving an attempt to undo a settlement agreement by way of subrogation and reverse an award of expert witness fees, the California Court of Appeal began its opinion even more dramatically: “What the heck?!? At one point, the trial court commented, ‘This is one of the most screwed up cases I’ve ever seen.’ We heartily agree.” Click here to read the opinion.

Why highlight such a “screwed up” case in a blog dedicated to helping people resolve construction disputes? Well, we can learn a lot from the opinion-someone else’s pain can be our gain, so to speak. First, the case reminds us that settlement agreements are contracts with consequences. And second, rejecting statutory settlement offers also has consequences.

Facts About the Case

A man was injured when he stepped on a nail in a restaurant that was being refurbished. As a result of the accident, the man’s leg was amputated, and he sued the restaurant and property owner, alleging that they “negligently managed, controlled and supervised the demolition being done on the premises, and failed to take reasonable precautionary measures to protect him from a risk of harm, which caused his injuries.

Essex Insurance Company provided a defense to the purported property owner who was not its named insured, but did not discover its mistake until after judgment was entered following a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. Litigation ensued over Essex’s obligation to pay the judgment. Essex eventually entered into a global settlement with the plaintiff that had the effect of resolving three lawsuits, including the personal injury action and a bad faith action plaintiff brought against Essex, in exchange for a lump sum payment. The settlement agreement did not allocate the payment among the three lawsuits or resolve issues regarding the identity of Essex’s insured.

Essex then sought indemnity from plaintiff’s physician who had treated him after the accident with the nail, on a theory of equitable subrogation for his proportionate liability for the amount Essex paid in settlement. The doctor filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted on the basis that Essex had waived any claim for equitable subrogation. In a post-judgment order, the trial court also awarded the doctor the cost of his expert witness fees. On appeal, Essex challenged both the judgment and the order. The Court of Appeal " agreed with the trial court that Essex must lie in the bed it made,” and affirmed.

Settlement Contract

The settlement agreement between Essex, the property owner, and the plaintiff included a lump sum payment of $700,000 which resolved three pending cases, including a bad faith action against Essex. The settlement agreement did not allocate payment amounts among the three pending cases; there was no statement about how much was being paid to compensate plaintiff for his personal injury. Accordingly, the trial court found Essex had impliedly waived its subrogation rights when it failed to enter into separate settlement agreements or otherwise apportion the amount paid among the three lawsuits. The Court of Appeal agreed:

Essex’s contention, however, shows why an implied waiver is applicable here — without resort to extrinsic evidence that is most likely inadmissible, it is impossible to prove how much was paid to settle each claim. Moreover, Essex ignores the other issues it failed to address in the settlement agreement apart from apportionment of the damages between the three lawsuits that shows it did not step into its insured’s shoes in paying the settlement, such as the failure to identify its insured or to apportion damages between economic and non-economic damages.

On appeal, Essex contended the trial court should have considered the inference that the settlement payment was compensation for the personal injury claim of the plaintiff and even suggested that evidence outside the body of the settlement contract could be offered to show the intent of the parties. The Court disagreed, stating that such extrinsic evident would most likely be inadmissible and that in any event, Essex waived its right to equitable subrogation by its actions.

Expert Witness Fees

The doctor made a statutory offer of settlement to Essex in compliance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 998. (Click here for a previous post on statutory offers: Settlement Negotiations: Don't Get Smacked by the Statutory Stick.) The good doctor’s offer to Essex was this: dismiss your claims for a waiver of costs. Essex did not accept and after the trial court ruled in favor of the doctor, he asked for an award of costs that included payment of his expert witness fees of $28,000. Essex opposed the award on the grounds that the statutory offer for a waiver of costs was not given in good faith. In denying Essex’s challenge to the order to pay expert fees, the Court of Appeal noted:

An offer to compromise may be “realistically reasonable” and justify cost shifting even though the party receiving the offer is unlikely to accept it as a consequence of the party’s skewed valuation of the case. Here, Essex recovered nothing from Dr. Heck. Dr. Heck’s offer is presumed reasonable and it is Essexā€Ÿs burden to show otherwise.

As a result, Essex was ordered to pay the doctor's expert witness fees. Thus, not only did Essex lose the right to shift the burden of its settlement payment to the doctor through equitable subrogation, the doctor was able to shift the costs of litigation onto Essex through the statutory offer procedures of Code of Civil Procedure section 998.

Lessons to be Learned

  1. Settlement Agreements are contracts. They will be interpreted and enforced according to the standard rules of contract interpretation and the laws of evidence. Therefore, settlement agreements must be written with the utmost care. In particular, one should be concerned about the scope of the release to be sure that the intent of the parties is accurately reflected.
  2. Statutory offers must be considered in the light of the laws of the local jurisdiction where the case is pending. It is not wise to react emotionally to a statutory offer of settlement. One should seek to evaluate such offers based upon objective criteria rather than the party's skewed valuation of the case, as noted in the Essex case. Remember, the party challenging the statutory offer generally has the burden of proving it is unenforceable.

So now you know about the "What the heck?!?" case. I hope it will help you when you are attempting to resolve your next case, even if it presents a "doozy of a puzzle."

Study Shows Attorney Overconfidence is a Barrier to the Efficient Resolution of Disputes

 

Barriers to conflict resolution are many, and much has been written about them. In Insightful or Wishful: Lawyer’s Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, a legal studies research paper for the new law school at the University of California at Irvine, noted American psychologist Elizabeth Loftus addresses another barrier to settlement that we lawyers are loath to admit: overconfidence. Indeed, the “saber rattling” of mediation colloquy can sound like the dramatic dialogue out of a Star Wars movie:

Luke: Soon I’ll be dead and you with me. Translated: We’re spending a boatload of money litigating this case but you will run out of money before we do.

The Emperor: [laughing] Perhaps you refer to the eminent attack of your rebel fleet? Yes, I assure you, we are quite safe from your friends here. Translated: Perhaps you refer to your army of expensive expert witnesses. They are no threat to us. I assure you we are prepared to destroy their testimony.

Luke: Your overconfidence is your weakness. Translated: Your overconfidence is your weakness.

The Emperor: Your faith in your friends is yours. Translated: Don’t count on the jury to bail you out of this one.

But lawyers are supposed to be confident, right? Yes, but there is a difference between having confidence and the courage of your convictions and overconfidence and the consequences of poor judgment. In an amusing analogy, Professor Loftus compares and contrasts lawyers and weather forecasters.

First, meteorologists cannot in any way influence the outcome of their predictions. Nothing they do can make it rain. Lawyers, on the other hand, can behave in ways that influence the case outcome. Because they have this opportunity, they may overestimate their own capacity and neglect the importance of factors beyond their control. Second, lawyers have a much keener interest in the goals of their predictions than do meteorologists. Because of this, lawyers might be susceptible to over optimism and wishful thinking.

The central focus of Professor Loftus’ study is the degree of accuracy in lawyers’ forecasts of case outcomes. To read the entire research paper click here. (PDF)  Meanwhile, the following quotes provide a glimpse of her insightful observations :

In summary, whether lawyers can accurately predict the outcome of a case has practical consequences in at least three areas: (a) the lawyer’s professional reputation and financial success; (b) the satisfaction of the client; and (c) the justice environment as a whole. Litigation is risky, time consuming, and expensive.

The consequences of judgmental errors by lawyers can be costly for lawyers and their clients, as well as an unnecessary burden on an already overloaded justice system. Ultimately, a lawyer’s repute is based on successful calculations of case outcome. A lawyer who advises clients to pursue litigation without delivering a successful outcome will not have clients for long. Likewise, a client will be most satisfied with a lawyer who is accurate and realistic when detailing the potential outcomes of the case. At the end of the day, it is the accurate predictions of the lawyer that enable the justice system to function smoothly without the load of cases that were not appropriately vetted by the lawyers.

A lawyer who cannot accurately predict the outcome of a case or who does not thoroughly and efficiently appreciate the litigation risks may ignore alternatives to trial and advise the client to reject reasonable settlement offers. A lawyer who underestimates potential outcomes may advise the client to accept an unreasonably lower amount in settlement than is warranted.

Another factor that might affect the realism of lawyers’ assessments of future goals is perception of control. The extent to which an individual believes he or she can take steps to increase the likelihood of a desirable outcome has been shown to bias confidence estimates in those outcomes. When an event is perceived to be controllable, overconfidence is likely. This bias is linked to what Langer (1975) called an illusion of control, defined as “an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant”.

Lawyers frequently made substantial judgmental errors, showing a proclivity to over optimism. The most biased estimates were expressed with very high initial confidence: In these instances, lawyers were extremely overconfident. These findings are consistent with a large body of literature documenting overconfidence in a range of judgments.

With regard to gender, we replicated results obtained by Malsch (1990) that female lawyers were better calibrated than their male colleagues. Male practitioners were more overconfident than female practitioners. These findings are in line with gender differences observed in research on metacognition.

One implication of the present findings is that lawyer performance can be improved by implementing case management strategies that take into account the potential overconfidence biases of the litigators.Case consultations with legal peers can take place informally. For example, in many legal firms, regular meetings are held where cases are periodically reviewed so that the partners can manage the caseload efficiently and ethically. These meetings provide ideal opportunities to obtain objective opinions from other legal professionals in the form of third-party feedback about the strengths and weaknesses of a case and the likelihood that the stated goals can be achieved.

 

This study shows that lawyers can be too confident. When lawyers do not fully assess the risks or acknowledge certain aspects of the case that may be beyond their control, over-(and under) valuations can happen, making settlement impossible. Objectivity requires lawyers to walk a fine line, some would call it a high wire balancing act, between zealous advocacy and wise counsel. Indeed, wisdom is the safety net that keeps litigators from crashing to the earth.

May the Force be with you.

 

 

Resolving Construction Disputes: Is A Jury Trial Right For You?

My thanks to construction lawyer Chris Hill for the opportunity to guest post today on his superb blog, Construction Law Musings.Chris is also an avid Twitter guy and can be followed  here.

Here's my guest post:

I am very happy to guest muse about construction law today, but first I want to muse a bit about the original Muses of Greek mythology, and their Dad Zeus. Why? Because some times the history of a construction project reads like a Greek tragedy.

 You might remember that the Muses were goddesses of the arts and sciences, including poetry and history, geometry and astronomy, tragedy and comedy. Their Dad was a pretty powerful guy: he could control the weather and give orders to any mortal or god, except The Fates, the goddesses of destiny who controlled the life and destiny of everyone.

Construction Muses (and their male counterparts) of our day are the gifted ones who design, finance, supply, and build our edifices of granite, steel and stone. Each project has Zeus-like figures who are effective leaders and very good at giving orders but, unfortunately for schedulers and unlike Zeus, can not control the weather.

But when misfortune strikes, turning construction professionals into adversaries, it is The Fates who control the futures and fortunes of the combatants.  Who are The Fates in the construction world? Jurors, ordinary men and women deemed by law as The Great Deciders of the fates of all who enter the temples of justice we call courthouses.

Since jurors wield such great power, jury dynamics should be carefully considered by anyone wanting a jury trial.  This is especially true for members of the construction industry because delay claims, defect cases, and most other types of construction disputes take longer, involve more witnesses, require more exhibits, and are generally more complex than the average case pending in civil courts.

This is not to suggest that jury trials should be avoided at all costs. If your opponent’s unrealistic view of the risks of trial results in low-ball negotiation tactics or a scorched earth litigation strategy, you may decide to accept the risks and limitations of a jury trial because you feel you have no other choice. I have been there and done that. If you go this route, there are Three Myths about Juries you should know about: 

Myth No. 1: Justice is served when a dispute is submitted to a “jury of one’s peers”.

  

The truth is the U.S. Constitution does not give you a right to a trial by a jury of your peers. The Seventh Amendment simply preserves the right to trial by jury in civil cases “and no fact tried by a jury, shall otherwise be reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law.” Therefore, while jurors are the judges of the facts in a trial, they need not be your peers. A “Peer” is defined as “One’s Equal,” and opposing counsel will make sure that none of your peers in the construction industry are on the jury.

Some trial consultants believe that a case is won or lost during the jury selection process. That is when lawyers ask prospective jurors, who are under oath, various questions about their backgrounds, attitudes, and experiences, ostensibly for the purpose of ensuring the jurors can be impartial, but in reality they are trying to stack the deck in their favor. This is part of our adversarial system of justice, and state laws give lawyers the opportunity to ask the judge to dismiss any jurors who may have actual or perceived biases; the lawyers are also given peremptory challenges to kick a number of people off the jury for any reason at all.

As a result of the jury selection process, you can be sure that the members of your jury will have little, if any, experience in the construction industry. They will not be your peers. If the trial concerns an architect’s alleged design errors, you can be sure that opposing counsel will not let an architect get on the jury. Likewise, it is unlikely that a spouse of a contractor would be selected when the trial is about construction defects

 

Myth No. 2: Jury verdicts are based solely on the evidence and the law.

 

 The truth is jurors bring their experiences, personalities, and perceptions into the courtroom and these things shape the views of what they are seeing and sharpen the tones of what they are hearing.  As a result, it is very difficult to know how the unique facts of your case will be received by the jury. The following answers to post-trial surveys conducted by Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Jacqueline Connor are enlightening (and frightening):

 

I disliked that the whiny plaintiff thought his problem was worth the court's and 14 jurors' time.

Too many attorneys take too many cases to court. This was exactly one of those that should never have been brought.

The defense attorney was popping TUMS. What's wrong?

She was good, logical, kind of dull, though. And needs to update her wardrobe (button hanging off.) Stuff like that is distracting.

Skilled and articulate but his hair was a little long to be compatible with his high quality dress without suggesting shiftiness. 

Myth No. 3: The evidence so clearly supports my position, the jury will be compelled to render a verdict in my favor. 

The truth is you do not know what evidence the jury will hear. That will depend on the judge and how he or she applies the rules of evidence, and no two judges are exactly alike when it comes to their rulings on the evidence. Throughout the trial, the judge will rule on dozens of objections by your opponent regarding hearsay, relevance, and admissibility. These snap decisions will have long-term implications for your case.

Prior to trial the judge will likely rule on several motions in limine, in which the parties will try to exclude whole segments of your case and prevent any reference to them in front of the jury. Oftentimes the basis for such motions is that the information is more prejudicial than it is probative. In other words, that dynamite piece of information that you know will blow away the jury may never be heard because it may move the jury to an irrational decision based on passion. We called that kind of evidence “zingers” in my trial attorney days. Unfortunately, judges rarely let the zingers out of the bag.

You might think that even if the jury does not hear or understand all the evidence, they certainly will be convinced by the opinions of your expert witnesses. Most jury instructions regarding expert witnesses say something like this:

 

You do not have to accept an expert’s opinion. As with any other witness, it is up to you to decide whether you believe the expert’s testimony and choose to use it as a basis for your decision. You may believe all, part, or none of an expert’s testimony….”

(CACI Jury Instruction No. 219.) 

Of course, the other side will offer the testimony of equally impressive experts to contradict the opinions of your expert witnesses. The jury then has to decide which set of experts to believe, which can be a fifty-fifty proposition.

 

Conclusion

 

These "myths" reflect a sobering fact: after closing argument, you cede responsibility for the outcome of your case to strangers, most of who, if not all, will have no background in construction. Before giving up that control, be sure you have carefully considered how well your case will be perceived by the jury. Try to look at your case objectively, not from your perspective as a seasoned construction professional, but through the eyes of people who have no experience in the construction industry.

We have the best legal system in the world and people who serve on juries perform an extremely important civic duty; it’s just that trials are not the most effective way to resolve construction disputes.Chris Hill has mused plenty about alternative dispute resolution procedures that are better suited for the resolution of construction disputes. In mediation, for example, you retain control over the outcome. Arbitration is another alternative to trial, but you are still giving an arbitrator control over your fate. You can, however, mitigate this by customizing the dispute resolution provisions in your contracts to fashion an arbitration proceeding to your liking.

I can’t resist the urge to end this guest post musing with a quote from Greek mythology (think jurors): “It was built against the will of the immortal gods, and so it did not last long.”(Homer, The Iliad.)

Winner Ordered to Pay Opponent's Fees and Costs in CA Construction Defect Case

Bidding a construction project: is a little like going to trial: you put your best team of estimators together, they pour over the plans and specs, every contingency is thoroughly considered, and bingo, just like you planned, you're awarded the contract. Sometimes, however, the unexpected or unanticipated happens, and their goes your profit. An award at trial can be like that-you can lose even when you win, despite the excellent preparation and work by your trial team. The Supreme Court of California demonstrated this in a decision published February 4, 2010 (PDF), arising from a construction defect case that was filed in 2001.

Here's a summary of what happened: The homeowners bought a new home in beautiful Laguna Beach, California. Various construction defects surfaced shortly after the sale of the property. The homeowners sued everyone and their uncle, eventually settling with all but one of them. The trial court found the $230,000 in settlement money paid by five of the defendants was appropriate given the damages suffered and found that the settlement was done in "good faith," which meant that the settling defendants would be completely out of the lawsuit and no longer faced the threat of indemnity claims. The homeowners proceeded to trial against the non-settling defendant where the jury awarded them $146,000.

That was the good news; the bad news was the trial court ruled that even though the homeowners were awarded damages, the amount of the damages had to be off-set by the pre-trial settlement, resulting in a finding that the homeowners would get nothing as a result of the trial and, in fact, since they were not the prevailing party, they were ordered to pay the attorney fees of $132,000 and  $12,000 in costs to the non-settling defendant.

The decision was based on the Supreme Court's interpretation of California statutes, and the statutes reflect the intent of California lawmakers and that of most state legislators to create a legal system that encourages settlement and punishes those who reject reasonable settlements and then do worse at trial than they would have done had they accepted the pre-trial settlement offer. This can be a shock to litigants. They learn the hard way the painful lesson that even if you win, you can lose at trial.

Will LEED Have a Greenhouse Effect on Litigation?

LEED standards for the greening of construction projects may leave people red-faced. Before the dust settles on these new standards.. Clay Olson at South Carolina Construction Defect Law has written a thought-provoking post regarding the uncertainty of LEED standards and the potential for adding to the risks associated with construction. Clay writes:

"There are no universally accepted standards for this type of construction. To qualify that statement, let me state that  there is  no universally accepted standard for what qualifies as green or, sustainable building.  While some municipalities in states such as California have enacted standards recently, I will guarantee you that those standards fail to scratch the surface in comparison to what is actually intended by code regulations.  While there is not much doubt that many green projects will fail to deliver the promised environmental savings, there is an almost greater certainty that the mixing of technology with tradition will yield problems that we have yet to recognize."

I share Clay's concern about the unintended consequences of LEED applications on the construction industry. Contractors must be astute risk takers given the high costs of construction, and profit margins that are relatively low. The ambiguity of LEED standards injects unknowns in the bid preparation process that will likely create a greenhouse effect on litigation.